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INTRODUCTION
In April 2010, the Arizona legislature enacted the Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act.1 Commonly known as
SB 1070, the law created a slate of new criminal offenses and arrest
powers covering aliens within Arizona’s borders.2 SB 1070 proved
divisive. It inspired copycat legislation in several states,3 provoked
sharp criticism from the legal academy,4 and—most relevant here—

1.
Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, 41), as amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws
2162; see also id. § 1 (“The legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative
enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout all of Arizona.”).
2.
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497–98 (2012) (describing core
provisions). SB 1070 created new, state-level, immigration-related crimes, such as working in the
state without authorization and failing to carry an immigration document; allowed police to
arrest people suspected of being removable from the United States; required police to investigate
the immigration status of those lawfully stopped, detained, or arrested; and enabled immigration
enforcement activities by public employees. Id.
3.
See, e.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 535 (LexisNexis); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011,
2011 Ga. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 252 (LexisNexis); Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act,
2011 Utah Adv. Legis. Serv. 21 (LexisNexis) (codified in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN.
tits. 76, 77), as amended by Act of Mar. 15, 2011, 2011 Utah Adv. Legis. Serv. 18 (LexisNexis).
4.
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation
of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 252 (2011) (arguing that state
immigration prosecutions are “irremediably unconstitutional”); Gabriel J. Chin, Carissa Byrne
Hessick, Toni Massaro & Marc L. Miller, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill
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catalyzed a lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice seeking a
preliminary injunction against the state law on the ground that it was
preempted by federal law.5 Initially, the federal government’s
litigation prospects seemed dim. One term before SB 1070 reached the
Supreme Court, the Justices had upheld an earlier Arizona effort to
tamp down on undocumented aliens in the workplace. Doing so, the
Court had limned a narrow reach for the preemptive penumbra of
federal immigration law.6 In the SB 1070 oral argument, the Solicitor
General seemed to fare poorly, with Justice Sotomayor even
suggesting that his central preemption argument was not “selling very
well” and that he try “to come up with something else.”7
Yet in June 2012, the Court handed down an opinion giving the
federal government “close” to everything it had sought.8 By a vote of
five Justices to three, the Court invalidated three of the four
challenged provisions and upheld the fourth subject only on condition
that the state satisfied demanding limiting qualifications.9 What
many expected to be a rout in favor of Arizona’s position10 ended
instead in a robust affirmation of national authority. What is more
interesting, at least for our purposes, is how the majority and
dissenting Justices reached their results. Both Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona v. United
States began not with statutory or constitutional text, but rather with
1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 77 (2010) (addressing concerns about state power to regulate
immigration and preemption by federal law).
5.
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339
(9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
6.
In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the Court upheld Arizona’s alien employment law,
which allowed the suspension and revocation of business licenses for employing unauthorized
aliens and required every employer to verify the employment eligibility of hired employees
through a specific Internet-based system. The Court emphasized the “high threshold [that] must
be met if a state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act.” 131 S.
Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment)).
7.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. 11-182), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts
/11-182.pdf. We say “even” because Justice Sotomayor is not one who would have been expected
ex ante to disfavor the government’s position in the case.
8.
David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41, 45 (2012).
9.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–09 (2012) (invalidating criminal
penalties on the nonpossession of immigration documents and applications for unauthorized
work, and also the power of warrantless arrest, but upholding, with limitations, police power to
require the production of immigration papers).
10. See, e.g., Edward Sifuentes, Three USD Professors Say Arizona Law Is Constitutional,
N. COUNTY TIMES (May 13, 2010, 7:44 PM), http:// www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty
/article_9631a761-1a36-597b-8467-2173655b4465.html (“Professor Lawrence Alexander, who
teaches constitutional law at USD, said that [the constitutional] argument would fail because the
Arizona law does not conflict with federal immigration law.”).
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a judicial presumption about the appropriate distribution of authority
between the federal government and the states on matters of
intersecting state and federal foreign affairs–related concerns. In both
opinions, that threshold presumption powerfully motivated the
ensuing analysis.
For Justice Kennedy, “[t]he federal power to determine
immigration policy is well settled” because of its entanglement in
foreign affairs.11 Immigration “affect[s] trade, investment, tourism,
and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation,”12 and so touches “ ‘the
most important and delicate of all international relationships.’ ”13 By
contrast, Justice Scalia opened with the opposite presumption: “As a
sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons from its
territory, subject only to those limitations expressed in the
Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress.”14 That
principle quickly yielded the result that “the federal alien registration
system is certainly not of uniquely federal interest.”15
This Article takes up the core of the debate between Justices
Kennedy and Scalia. More precisely, it analyzes how courts should
resolve cases that arise at the intersection of foreign affairs and
federalism concerns when there is no dispositive constitutional,
statutory, or treaty-derived rule. Cognizant of the competing
approaches in Arizona, it considers the appropriate judicial
presumption across the board in foreign affairs federalism cases. But
the choice of presumption matters well beyond immigration-related
cases. Indeed, the Court repeatedly confronts cases in which
federalism and foreign affairs claims conflict and no text supplies clear
direction.16 Previous cases involve not only immigration authority,17
11. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)).
14. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Thomas and Alito filed separate dissents
(neither joining Justice Scalia’s opinion) on narrower grounds pertaining to the application of
preemption doctrine, rather than reasoning grounded on federalism-first principles.
15. Id. at 2518.
16. Some scholars point to “a structural change . . . that has begun to transform the global
order of unitary nation-states into a system that empowers subfederal units such as the
American states.” CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & JOHN C. BLAKEMAN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND
NEW FEDERALISM: FROM THE REHNQUIST TO THE ROBERTS COURT 190 (2012). This implies that
foreign affairs federalism cases will continue to arise with some frequency before the Supreme
Court.
17. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (upholding California regulation of alien
employment against preemption challenge); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941)
(invalidating Pennsylvania’s 1939 Alien Registration Act); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,
279, 281 (1875) (invalidating California bonding requirement for certain international
passengers).
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but also state efforts to sanction repressive foreign regimes,18
encourage restitution for Holocaust survivors,19 settle money claims
against foreign nations and their citizens,20 tax the global activities of
corporations operating within a state’s borders,21 and impose capital
punishment
notwithstanding
objections
from
international
22
organizations and courts. Nor does the Supreme Court resolve all
such conflicts. Lower courts also address and provide final dispositions
of many disputes arising at the intersection of foreign affairs and
federalism without the guidance of statute or treaty.23 There is, in
sum, no shortage of justiciable controversies raising the knotty
question of foreign affairs federalism.
This Article offers a functional analysis of that problem by
asking what presumption best serves to maximize diverse
constitutional goods. Although any effort to identify the goods our
Constitution is meant to promote will be controversial, it seems
plausible in our view to say that social welfare, a robust democratic
process, and individual rights are among them.24 Our rough
18. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (invalidating
Massachusetts statute that imposed penalties on companies dealing with Burma); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (invalidating Oregon escheat law that imposed reciprocal
requirements that disabled citizens of certain Communist Bloc countries from inheriting
property). The Court’s opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), can
also be situated in this class.
19. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (invalidating California
insurance law related to unresolved Holocaust-related claims).
20. These cases involve preemption of state common law claims respecting contract or
property interests. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 241–42 (1942) (affirming dismissal of
a suit to recover the assets of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937) (reversing dismissal of an action by the federal
government to recover a sum of money deposited by a Russian corporation).
21. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994) (upholding
California’s worldwide reporting requirement for corporate income tax); Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty.
of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (invalidating application of ad valorem property tax on foreign
shipping).
22. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23 (2008) (holding that the President lacks
authority to delay Texas executions based on an International Court of Justice judgment); see
also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 359–60 (2006) (finding that consular rights treaty
did not oust state procedural bar rules).
23. See, e.g., Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1208 n. 2, 1210
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (rejecting challenge to state ban on use of university funds for
travel to listed “terrorist state[s]”); Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901, 903
(9th Cir. 2010), rev’g 578 F.3d 1052 (2009) (considering state law tort suit based on human rights
violations against Armenians); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518–19 (M.D.
Pa. 2007) (invalidating local immigration regulation).
24. In harmony with most consequentialist analysis in public law, we do not specify a
complete welfare function to maximize. Rather, we recognize that there are a plurality of goods
to maximize, including (as mentioned in the text) welfare, democratic process values, and
individual rights. Our (weak) assumption is that it is desirable to maximize some bundle of those
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consequentialist approach requires a specification of both the costs
and the benefits of different approaches. The central task of this
Article, therefore, is to assess the strength of states’ federalism
interest and the national government’s foreign affairs interest in such
cases. We offer two key results. First, accepting the conventional
economic case for federalism, states have an interest in foreign affairs
federalism matters that is no less powerful than in domestic-policy
domains. Second, the national government’s interest in foreign policy
control varies in magnitude over time. Putting these results together,
we conclude that whereas states and the federal government both
have interests in regulating what we term “foreign affairs federalism
disputes,” the relative strength of their respective interests varies
with changing geopolitical circumstances.
Translating this analysis into a doctrinal form, we conclude
that courts should vary the operative presumption in foreign affairs
federalism cases over time. Sometimes the states should receive the
benefit of the doubt, sometimes the federal government should. We
offer a parsimonious rule to discern when the federal interest likely
rises to the level to oust state interests. This rule is based on the
concept of polarity in international relations. Briefly stated, the
federal government’s interest is at its zenith—and hence should be
most respected by courts—when the United States is in a multipolar
global environment. In this context, the United States is significantly
constrained and the benefits of centralizing authority in the national
government are plural. Correlatively, the federal interest is weakest
when the United States has hegemonic influence in a unipolar world.
The United States’ status as a superpower frees it from some
constraints, and the benefits of centralizing authority in the national
government are present but smaller. On this view, we argue, the
Court in Arizona erred by simply stipulating the “important and
delicate”25 matters of international relationships as the launching
point for its analysis without further elaboration. Although we
disagree with the Court’s specific reasoning, we suggest that its
ultimate result might nonetheless be justified on more subtle grounds.
To defend this conclusion, we engage first in a critical project
and then offer our own reconstruction of the doctrine. Accordingly, we
begin by offering critiques of leading accounts of foreign affairs
federalism. For the sake of convenience, we group these accounts into
values. We also do not offer a precise qualitative welfarist analysis. Again in common with most
public law analysis, our evaluation of different rules’ welfare effects necessarily relies on some
estimation on our part.
25. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)).
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two camps, which we label “formalist”—which is generally pitched on
originalist terrain—and “functionalist”—which attends more to
consequences.26 Formalist accounts tend to favor the states.27 We
reject these formalist accounts on methodological grounds.
Disagreement about original understandings means the Founding-era
history is indeterminate. In any event, such arguments fail to account
for changing institutional and geopolitical circumstances, making
policies that were desirable in 1787 seem dysfunctional in 2012. In our
view, this problem of “translation”28 is so intractable and pervasive in
foreign affairs that little benefit accrues from framing inquiries in
originalist terms.
Functionalist accounts, by contrast, focus on how institutional
choices promote various constitutional goods. We believe that
functionalist analyses provide more promising avenues for analyzing
the foreign affairs federalism problem. Existing accounts offered by
Professors Jack Goldsmith and David Sloss identify the correct
questions.29 We respectfully differ from their respective approaches,
even as we benefit from their real insights, over their treatment of the
relevant costs and benefits.

26. We employ the familiar terms “functionalist” and “formalist” because we believe they
capture important elements of the relevant theories. We do not here aim to explore the familiar
distinction between functionalist and formalist approaches to the separation of powers. All that
is at stake here is a convenience of labeling, and not some deeper jurisprudential insight.
27. The leading such account is Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign
Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341
(2000); see also Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV.
1573, 1575–76 (2007) (arguing against the validity of sole executive agreements, in part for
federalism reasons, on originalist grounds). But see Matthew Schaefer, Constraints on StateLevel Foreign Policy: (Re)Justifying, Refining and Distinguishing the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Doctrine, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 201, 221–28 (2011) (employing text and original meaning to
reach a conclusion in favor of more federal authority). A similar position can be defended using
structural arguments—i.e., derived from first principles of the separation of powers and
federalism. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
825, 830–32 (2004) (arguing in favor of state control on the basis of formalist axioms of structural
constitutionalism).
28. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1170–71 (1993)
(developing the idea that original constitutionalists may require “translation” to ensure fidelity
under changed circumstances).
29. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 178
[hereinafter Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption] (analyzing the doctrines and
justifications for the Court’s preemption jurisprudence); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1622 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith,
Federal Courts] (focusing on functional arguments as opposed to historical claims); David Sloss,
International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963,
1964–65 (2003) (noting the different effects of treaties, congressional executive agreements, and
sole executive agreements).
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In lieu of those existing accounts, we develop a novel
functionalist analysis of how courts should resolve foreign affairs
federalism disputes in the absence of decisive guidance from Congress.
Since our focus is upon cases in which neither the House nor the
Senate has spoken to a specific question, the inquiry here is really
about when the President should win out against the several states in
the absence of compelling evidence of congressional intent.30 To that
end, we consider systematically the advantages and costs of
centralizing foreign relations power. This analysis requires first the
identification of benefits that accrue from state policies that impinge
on foreign affairs–related matters. It further demands consideration of
whether the federal executive will consider those benefits in his or her
policymaking. Scholars of federalism have long argued that there are
“political safeguards” of federalism within the national policymaking
framework.31 A foundational question for our analysis is whether
those safeguards operate equally in the foreign policy domain to
mitigate the need for judicial intervention. In brief, we conclude that
state policymaking on matters touching on foreign affairs does accrue
benefits traditionally associated with decentralized policymaking, but
that any political safeguards are likely to be weaker than in the
domestic-policy context. This result provides a potential justification
for judicial solicitude for federalism values.
But this does not end the analysis. The idea that federal
primacy on external matters yields immediate benefits, of course, is
hardly unfamiliar.32 Indeed, it has prompted incautious language from
the Supreme Court that “[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by
the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.”33 We
diverge from this conventional wisdom by positing that the benefits of
presidential control of foreign policy are not fixed. Instead, we argue
that the benefits of centralizing foreign affairs control in the

30. For a cogent and insightful development of this point in the immediate aftermath of the
Arizona decision, see Eric Posner, The Imperial President of Arizona, SLATE (June 26, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/the_supreme_court_s_ari
zona_immigration_ruling_and_the_imperial_presidency_.html.
31. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954)
(noting that states play a “crucial role in the selection and the composition of the national
authority”).
32. For canonical statements of this principle, see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14–15, 149–69 (2d ed. 1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1846–52 (1998).
33. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 202, 233 (1942); accord United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (indicating that the President alone has the power to
negotiate with foreign nations).
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presidency vary over time. The strength of the federal interest is not
static because geopolitical circumstances are not static. And shifts in
those external circumstances—a factor that has until now been almost
wholly ignored in the legal scholarship—conduce to a federal interest
that waxes and wanes in intensity.34 We then offer a parsimonious
heuristic for courts to gauge those benefits: courts should be more
willing to credit the value of centralization in foreign affairs when the
international environment is multipolar—that is, when there is a
multiplicity of threats to U.S. influence and aims—but not when the
environment is unipolar, such that the United States is able to project
hegemonic power more effectively.35 A full account of both the
advantages and costs of centralizing foreign affairs authority in the
presidency yields a nuanced but tractable doctrinal rule that allows
for change over time. We also address the potential objection that such
a rule falls outside the reach of federal judges’ competence. In our
view, courts have been sensitive to geopolitical conditions in a
surprising proportion of cases—and often have no choice but to assess
such conditions—blunting arguments on institutional competence
grounds that courts should not employ any presumption.
We should at this threshold stage distinguish our inquiry from
others raised by scholars working at the intersection of federalism and
foreign affairs. First, we focus solely on instances in which neither
treaty nor statute supplies a dispositive rule of decision. As a result,
we do not address here the long-standing dispute about federalismbased constraints on the Treaty Power.36 Second, there is a longrunning debate concerning the status of customary international law
(“CIL”) as federal common law.37 The question addressed here,
however, does not concern CIL, but rather the resolution of disputes in
a “twilight” zone where legislative and constitutional sources of law
arguably apply but are incomplete.

34. See generally Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript on file with authors).
35. Id. (developing concepts of unipolarity and multipolarity and defending their analytic
utility).
36. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 394 (1998) (arguing that the federal government’s “plenary authority” under the
Treaty Power is inconsistent with American federalism), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2000) (supporting the Treaty Power as consistent with federalism).
37. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816 (1997) (no),
with Carlos M. Vasquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist
and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495,
1501 (2011) (yes).
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The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides necessary
background by cataloging cases that fall within the scope of our
inquiry. This includes instances in which there is a clash between the
presidential and state claims to regulatory authority but in which no
clear textual rule provides a solution. Part II explains how the extant
literature treats these clashes and argues that those treatments are
inadequate. Parts III and IV, the heart of our analysis, consider
respectively the costs and the benefits of centralizing policymaking
control in the presidency and show how our recommended
presumption applies to other Supreme Court cases.
I. FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE “ZONE OF TWILIGHT”
A. Defining the Domain of Inquiry
This Part identifies several strands of precedent in which the
Supreme Court grapples with the appropriate presumption—whether
pro–federal executive or pro-states—in cases where a decision
implicates both federalism and foreign affairs concerns, but no text
(constitutional, statutory, or treaty derived) directs an outcome.38 We
are concerned only with instances in which there is an “absence of
clear guidance from Congress”39 or the Constitution. These disputes
arise in what Justice Robert Jackson famously characterized as a
“zone of twilight.”40 In the Youngstown Steel Seizure case, Jackson set
forth a three-part typology of presidential action keyed to the degree of
congressional support present. Presidents (1) have “maximum”
legitimacy when acting with express authorization from Congress; (2)
enter a zone of twilight when “ac[ting] in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority”; and (3) are at the “lowest
38. Such cases arise when states regulate matters touching on international interests. This
happens with some frequency. See BANKS & BLAKEMAN, supra note 16, at 191 (“In the latter half
of the twentieth century, state governments have become increasingly activist in foreign affairs .
. . .”); Timothy J. Conlan, Robert L. Dudley & Joel F. Clark, Taking On the World: The
International Activities of American State Legislatures, 34 PUBLIUS 183, 184 (2004), available at
http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/34/3/183.full.pdf (“[S]tate and local governments in the
United States have become increasingly involved in international affairs.”); see also EARL H. FRY,
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 67–76
(1998) (discussing state and local economic and trade initiatives); id. at 91–100 (describing
noneconomic initiatives). Fry celebrates economic initiatives and describes noneconomic
initiatives as “worrisome.” Id. at 91. Fry simply assumes the force of this economic/noneconomic
distinction. But it is by no means clear that states’ legitimate interests should be limited to only
economic matters.
39. Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2010).
40. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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ebb” of power when “tak[ing] measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress.”41 Courts invoke this framework
in federalism cases as well as separation of powers cases.42 Jackson’s
intermediate zone of twilight produces copious litigation, as the costly
adversarial process of federal litigation typically selects from the
larger population of disputes a subset of particularly close and
contentious matters.43
How should the Court resolve such cases? Justice Jackson’s
guidance—his call to look toward “the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables”—is simultaneously inspiring and
useless.44 Quite how “events” and “imponderables” (whatever the
latter are) can generate reasoned and neutral justifications for
adjudication remains unclear more than a half century after Jackson
wrote. Rather than puzzling over Jackson’s enigmatic counsel, we
contend, courts must engage in a more mundane enterprise of crafting
an appropriate default presumption. In common with any other
instance in which the textual sources of law are either
underdetermined or ambiguous, judges must look beyond the express
words of a constitutional, statutory, or treaty-derived provision to
develop a default rule to break deadlocks. When engaged in the
complex task of statutory interpretation,45 judges often use such
presumptions, or “substantive canons,”46 as weights on the analytic

41. Id. at 635–38.
42. In the federalism context, Chief Justice Roberts invoked Youngstown in Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (invoking the “Youngstown framework”). Other important
applications of the framework include Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981)
(reporting that “both parties agree [that Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown]
brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area”),
and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 503 n.6 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citing the first part of Justice Jackson’s analysis).
43. The basic intuition here is that cases closer to the legal line will generate more
uncertainty about outcomes, and are thus more likely to be litigated. See George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984)
(explaining that in clear-cut cases, since the verdict is generally expected, parties tend to
compromise; in contrast, when the case is close, parties may anticipate different verdicts and
disagree as to the proper amount of the settlement). The Supreme Court’s selection of cases
involving important questions of law and circuit splits only amplifies that selection effect. See
SUP. CT. R. 10 (“[A] writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.”).
44. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
45. Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“The hard truth of the matter is that American
courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation.”).
46. William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 68–69 (1994).
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scales.47 Substantive canons commonly give effect to constitutionally
inspired (if not compelled) values such as the availability of judicial
review48 and individual rights.49 Pertinent here, the Court has applied
canons in favor of federalism50 and Article II presidential autonomy.51
The resolution of disputes between the federal government and the
states can implicate both federalism and foreign affairs concerns and
therefore trigger the application of competing, even diametrically
opposed, canons.52 As we show below, the Court more often than not
brokers these disputes in favor of presidential authority, although not
always. Precedent yields no obvious pattern.
This Part organizes jurisprudence in the zone of twilight by
substantive policy area. It first addresses immigration law, then
economic policy disputes, and finally treaty-related controversies.
B. Oscillating Positions in Federal Immigration Law
Consider first the Court’s erratic path on immigration matters.
The 1941 case of Hines v. Davidowitz concerned Pennsylvania’s Alien
Registration Act, which required specified aliens over the age of
eighteen to register with the state, pay an annual registration fee of

47. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2111 (1990) (noting canon’s reliance on “something external to legislative desires”); accord
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (noting that clear statement
rules protect constitutional values that otherwise would not be directly judicially enforced). See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–17 (2000)
(detailing the operation and advantages of canons that serve nondelegation principles).
48. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (requiring a clear statement from
Congress before eliminating jurisdiction to review an agency action).
49. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1979) (requiring a
clear statement of statutory authority for an agency action that impinged on First Amendment
interests).
50. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467–70 (1991) (using a clear statement rule to
shield states’ ability to determine the forms of their own government structures, a federalism
value not directly enforced by the Court); accord Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (requiring clear statement with respect to jurisdiction over
navigable waters).
51. See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) (construing the
Federal Advisory Committee Act narrowly lest it “infring[e] unduly on the President’s Article II
power to nominate federal judges and violat[e] the doctrine of separation of powers”). For a
general defense of a pro-presidential canon on institutional competence grounds, see Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1224
(2007).
52. For a claim in a classic article published in these pages to the effect that this is
endemic to the operation of legal canons, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401 (1950) (contending that “there are two opposing canons on almost every point”).
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one dollar, and carry an alien identification card at all times on
penalty of fines or imprisonment.53 By contrast, the relevant federal
statute, the Alien Registration Act, which contained no express
preemption provision, required solely that all aliens over the age of
fourteen register, provide information, and submit to fingerprint
identification. It did not require an alien to carry his or her
identification card or produce it upon request, and it imposed criminal
sanctions only for willful failures to comply.54 Despite the absence of
explicitly preemptive statutory text, the Hines Court held that
Congress intended to “occupy the field” via a comprehensive
regulatory framework to regulate naturalization, a power specifically
delegated to Congress in the Constitution.55 In so doing, the Court
pointed to the “possible international repercussions” of state
registration laws.56 And it left no doubt as to how it viewed the default
allocation of regulatory authority: “The Federal Government,
representing as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight states,
is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of
affairs with foreign sovereignties.”57
The next time the Justices addressed an immigration-related
foreign affairs federalism conflict, however, they set the default in
favor of the states. The 1976 case of De Canas v. Bica58 concerned a
California statute that prohibited employers from employing aliens
who could not demonstrate that they were lawfully in the United
States if their employment had a negative or “adverse effect” on the
employment opportunities of lawful residents.59 After Hines, the
argument that the federal immigration law ousted state regulation
from the field60 might have seemed strong. Instead, the Court began
by describing in sweeping terms state police power over regulation of

53. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59 (1941) (describing Pennsylvania law).
54. Id. at 60–61.
55. Id. at 62–64.
56. Id. at 64 n.12.
57. Id. at 63. Later in the opinion, the Court conceded that it had previously “made use of
the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these
expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick.” Id.
at 67.
58. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
59. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805(a), repealed by 1988 Cal. Stat., ch. 946, § 1 (stating, in
relevant part, that “[n]o employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful
residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful
resident workers”).
60. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 352–54 (rehearsing this argument).
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employment relationships.61 Against this backdrop, California’s
prohibition of “the knowing employment by California employers of
persons not entitled to lawful residence in the United States . . .
certainly [fell] within the mainstream of such police power
regulation.”62 Evincing a presumption in favor of state concern, the
Court demanded a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to oust
California’s law.63
Arizona v. United States64 continues this oscillation. During the
2011 term, the Court, acting in harmony with De Canas, applied a
presumption against the ouster of state immigration regulation where
there was no explicit federal statutory direction. The Court
emphasized the “high threshold [that] must be met if a state law is to
be preempted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act.”65
Yet—as we explained in the Introduction—Justice Kennedy’s Arizona
majority opinion treated Hines, not De Canas, as instructive guidance
on the sensitive foreign affairs concerns of the national government
with respect to immigration.66
C. Conflicts in Economic Regulation
Three lines of cases concern state and federal regulatory efforts
in what might be loosely termed “economic matters.” The first arose
against the backdrop of conflict with the Soviet Union. The second
emerged from more recent, and more localized, foreign policy conflicts.
The final series stemmed from the Court’s analysis of the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause power.
The first wave of cases arose in response to the 1918 Soviet
nationalization and appropriation of all assets held by Russian
companies anywhere in the world. In 1933, President Roosevelt
negotiated an agreement with the Soviet Union—the Litvinov
Agreement—executed through an exchange of letters with the Soviet
Foreign Commissar. In relevant part, the Agreement resolved all
outstanding claims by citizens and corporations of the United States
and the Soviet Union and required the assignment to the United

61. Id. at 356 (“States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the
employment relationship to protect workers within the State.”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 357.
64. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
65. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
66. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498–99 (discussing the connection of immigration and
foreign affairs concerns).
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States of all amounts due to the Soviet Union.67 Consistent with the
Agreement, the United States brought actions in federal district court
to confiscate the nationalized Russian assets held in New York.68 New
York law, however, treated the Soviet nationalization as an invalid act
of confiscation, thus teeing up a conflict with federal law.69 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Pink70 and United States v.
Belmont71 easily resolved that conflict in favor of federal authority. As
the Belmont Court pithily stated, “[T]he external powers of the United
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies.”72 If
doubt persisted about the locus of the applicable default rule, it added
that “[i]n respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and
in respect of our foreign relations generally . . . the state of New York
does not exist.”73
This powerful presumption in favor of federal executive action
also helped resolve a 1968 challenge to an Oregon property law. The
state statute at issue in that case provided for escheat to the state
when a nonresident alien claimed real or personal property as an heir
of an Oregon resident unless, inter alia, the alien nation allowed U.S.
nationals to inherit.74 In Zschernig v. Miller, the Court invalidated the
application of Oregon’s law to an East German national. Invoking
Hines, the Court summarily dispatched the state statute as “an
intrusion . . . into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution
entrusts to the President and the Congress.”75
State economic regulation fared no better in the second line of
cases, which arose in the last two decades over more localized
67. Exchange of Communications Between the President of the United States and Maxim
M. Litvinov People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(Nov. 16, 1933), reprinted in 28 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (Supp. 1934).
68. E.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 213 (1942).
69. See United States v. Belmont, 85 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1936) (describing New York
policy).
70. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
71. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
72. Id. at 331.
73. Id. at 331–32; see also id. (“Within the field of its powers, whatever the United States
rightfully undertakes it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judicial authority is
invoked in aid of such consummation, State Constitutions, state laws, and state policies are
irrelevant to the inquiry and decision.”).
74. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430–31 (1968) (describing Oregon law). The Court
had previously upheld such state property rules against a facial challenge. See Clark v. Allen,
331 U.S. 503 (1947).
75. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432; see also id. at 435 (warning against “minute inquiries
concerning the actual administration of foreign law . . . [and] the credibility of foreign diplomatic
statements”). In other instances in which state regulation of alien property holdings had come
before the Court, Congress had entered treaties to resolve such property disputes. See, e.g.,
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (ousting Oregon law based on treaty with Yugoslavia).
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questions of foreign economic relations. In Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, the Court affirmed the preemption of a 1996
Massachusetts statute barring state agencies from purchasing most
goods and services from entities designated by the state as doing
business with Burma.76 Three months after the Burma law’s passage,
Congress enacted rules concerning Burma (including delimited
sanctions), restrictions on Burmese officials’ ability to enter the
United States, and prohibitions on new investment in Burma by
“United States persons.”77 It directed the President to create “a
comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and
improve human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma” and
authorized the White House to waive sanctions if the “national
security interests of the United States” so warranted.78 Despite the
absence of any express preemptive statutory text, the Court identified
the Massachusetts Burma law as “an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the Congress’s full objectives under the federal act.”79 That is, it
presumed “state law [was] naturally preempted to the extent of any
conflict with a federal statute,”80 even if they aimed for the same goal.
Three years later, the Court in American Insurance Ass’n v.
Garamendi struck down as preempted a California statute imposing
on insurance companies a set of disclosure obligations pertaining to
obligations to Holocaust victims.81 Garamendi, unlike Crosby, involved
no federal statute, but solely an agreement signed by the President
and the German Chancellor.82 That is, there was again no statutory
preemption. Citing Crosby, the Garamendi majority explained that “at
some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations
must yield to the National Government’s policy” on foreign relations,
including exercises of the President’s “independent authority.”83
Despite the absence of an on-point statute and the lack of a
preemption clause in the relevant presidential agreement—“[leaving
the] claim of preemption to rest on asserted interference with the

76. 530 U.S. 363, 366–67 (2000) (describing the so-called “Burma law” enacted by
Massachusetts).
77. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1997, enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
570, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
78. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369–70 (quotation omitted).
79. Id. at 373.
80. Id. at 372 (emphases added).
81. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
82. Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,”
U.S.-Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298.
83. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413–14.
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foreign policy”84—the Court held that California’s statute was
displaced. It reasoned that any “likelihood that state legislation will
produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express
foreign policy of the National Government would require preemption
of the state law.”85
Finally, there is a third line of cases concerning state economic
regulation that touches on international trade in ways that are
inconsistent with congressional authority to regulate commerce “with
foreign nations.”86 Two exemplary cases merit attention here. First, in
Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, the Court invalidated an ad
valorem property tax on foreign shipping that risked multiple
taxation.87 As in Garamendi, this ouster required no congressional
action, and no salient affirmative constitutional text existed. Rather,
the Court held that the fact that “[the subnational tax] prevent[ed] the
Federal Government from speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments” sufficiently
warranted preemption.88 In a later case, however, the Court declined
to preempt a controversial California corporate-tax rule that
calculated net income based on global assets.89 Formally applying the
doctrinal logic of Japan Line’s “one voice” test, Justice Ginsburg’s
majority opinion in substantial effect inclined instead toward a more
pro-state and antifederal position. She explained that in the absence
of “specific indications of congressional intent,” no ouster of state law
was warranted.90 Such a clear statement rule in effect shifts the
presumption in favor of the states and imposes a burden of persuasion
on those who favor centralized federal control.
D. The Vienna Convention and Capital Punishment
Treaties, as well as statutes, can cast penumbras that touch on
state law. In grappling with that conflict in the capital punishment
domain, the Court has strongly favored state control.91 For example, in
84. Id. at 417.
85. Id. at 420. The Court here was paraphrasing Justice Harlan, but doing so approvingly.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a useful survey of the doctrine, see Anthony J.
Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 966 (2010).
87. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (invalidating application of ad
valorem property tax on foreign shipping).
88. Id. at 453–54. For an early, nonfatal application of the “one voice” test, see Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9–13 (1986) (finding no uniform federal policy).
89. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994).
90. Id. at 324.
91. So much is also evident from pre-Medellín cases that declined either to regulate
directly state court criminal procedure or to oust procedural bars in habeas litigation pursuant to
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Medellín v. Texas92 the Supreme Court addressed a conflict between
the state’s capital punishment regime and the United States’
obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(“VCCR”). Medellín arose in the wake of the International Court of
Justice’s (“ICJ”) judgment in the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals, where the ICJ interpreted the United States’
obligations under the VCCR when an individual’s treaty-guaranteed
right to consular access has been violated by one of the several
states.93 The ICJ in Avena held that VCCR entitled such individuals to
“review and reconsideration” of their convictions.94 When a Texas
tribunal denied one of Avena’s beneficiaries, Ernesto Medellín, such
reconsideration, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum to
the U.S. Attorney General directing the United States to “discharge its
international obligations . . . by having State courts give effect to the
[Avena] decision.”95 As presented to the Supreme Court, the litigation
turned on a conflict between presidential implementation of a treaty
and state control of its postconviction-procedure rules.96 The ensuing
judgment in favor of Texas turned largely on a reticulated (and muchcontested) point of treaty-related doctrine: the idea that treaties are
not “self-executing,” in the sense of creating domestic legal obligations,
absent a clear statement to that effect.97 Effectively treating that
presumption as a way of proxying for congressional intent, the Court
found the presidential memo fell into Justice Jackson’s category of

the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”). Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
331 (2006); accord Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
92. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
93. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31). The Sanchez–Llamas Court declined to find authority in the VCCR for the judicial
imposition of a suppression remedy, in effect applying a pro-federalism default rule. 548 U.S. at
346–47. On grounds not salient here, it also declined to treat International Court of Justice
decisions as binding. Id. at 353–54.
94. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
65–66 (Mar. 31):
[T]he Court is of the view that, in cases where the breach of the individual rights of
Mexican nationals under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention has resulted . .
. the legal consequences of this breach have to be examined and taken into account in
the course of review and reconsideration. The Court considers that it is the judicial
process that is suited to this task.
95. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 498.
96. Id. at 503–04.
97. Id. at 504–13 (searching for congressional intent of self-execution respecting the
Convention and effectively imposing a default rule of nonexecution); accord Sanchez-Llamas, 548
U.S. at 347 (“[W]here a treaty does not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or
implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their
own.”).
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direct conflicts between legislative and executive wills, rather than the
zone of twilight articulated in Youngstown.98
At least with respect to treaties’ federalism-related
implications, a presumption against self-execution operates as a
default rule favoring states’ interests. Moreover, the Medellín Court
explicitly pointed to states’ interests in controlling their criminal
procedures to justify its conclusions. Chief Justice Roberts thus
cautioned against federal acts that reached too “deep into the heart of
the State’s police powers.”99 Citing federal habeas corpus precedent,
the Court insisted that “[s]tates possess primary authority for defining
and enforcing the criminal law.”100 It thus insisted that state
procedural-default rules apply absent a “clear and express statement”
to the contrary.101
The Court applied this presumption notwithstanding the
possibility that a given state’s policy decisions might have
externalities for the whole United States, in the form of increased
foreign policy complications. Despite the public-good character of the
national-security interest at stake in Medellín and the other cases
described here, the interest in maintaining a federal balance still
prevailed.102
***
This review of foreign affairs federalism jurisprudence reveals
an absence of any coherent principle operating across the cases. Some
rules of thumb nonetheless emerge from the overview of case law. The
federal government, for example, generally tends to prevail when
economic issues are in play (but not always); states tend to win when
their criminal justice systems might be affected; and immigrationrelated cases reveal wild oscillations. These results admit of no simple
principled explanation. At a minimum, therefore, it seems fair to
conclude the Supreme Court has failed to supply a principled doctrinal
test to interpret underdetermined or ambiguous congressional
directives in this domain.

98. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524–32 (analyzing Youngstown question).
99. Id. at 532
100. Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
101. Id. at 517 (citation omitted).
102. Medellín is not the only case in this area of law. See also Sanchez–Llamas, 548 U.S. at
331; accord Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM DILEMMAS: A CRITIQUE OF THE
EXISTING SOLUTIONS
This Part examines the leading scholarship analyzing how
judges should resolve deadlocks between federalism and foreign
affairs interests in the absence of a dispositive constitutional,
statutory, or treaty-derived rule. Broadly speaking, the literature
yields two strategies that can be usefully labeled as formalism and
functionalism. The formalist strategy relies on the original meaning of
(or inferences from) the constitutional text to identify categorical rules
for allocating regulatory authority. This approach yields “a fixed set of
rules and not by reference to some purpose of those rules.”103 By
contrast, a functionalist approach focuses on consequences. It begins
with a set of values or goods singled out by the Constitution as
particularly important. Then, it aims to develop workable, general
rules “designed to advance th[ose] ultimate purposes of” the
Constitution.104 Functionalists tend to be more sensitive to questions
of institutional choice and less concerned with the role of history than
formalists.
Profound theoretical disagreements about the status and
binding force of the Constitution as law engender and maintain this
divide.105 We do not aim here to resolve these disagreements; to do so
would take us far beyond this Article’s ambit. Instead, we use the
formalist and functionalist labels as useful labels, which link the
theories under discussion here to larger bodies of jurisprudential
thought. In our view, the labels fairly capture the salient attributes of
the two approaches to be found in the literature. Our modest goal in
this Part is to sketch and then critique the existing positions in the
limited domain of foreign affairs federalism using that familiar set of
labels as organizing devices.
103. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1138 (2000). The functionalist/formalist divide is familiar from debates on the separation of
powers, and we adapt it mutatis mutandi for use here because it provides a useful set of labels
for organizing the existing literature.
104. Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT.
REV. 225, 231.
105. Theories of constitutional interpretation differ on what the source of authority is for a
judge’s action—the historical fact of ratification or contemporary acceptance of the Constitution.
See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 606, 627–40 (2008) (discussing problems of constitutional authority). Theories also differ as
to how much discretion judges should possess. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 11–103 (2012) (describing and critiquing several leading theories of
constitutional interpretation on the ground that they endow judges with too much authority).
These two questions—on whose authority, and by which institution?—can usefully be understood
as organizing (if implicitly) questions in ongoing debates on constitutional hermeneutics.
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We make two central points. First, at least with respect to
foreign affairs federalism, the formalist approach quickly runs up
against inherent limitations and yields paradoxical results. We
accordingly reject it as a viable approach in this domain. Second, we
examine the two leading functionalist solutions, associated with
Professors Jack Goldsmith and David Sloss. Both, we believe, make
important and penetrating points. Nevertheless, we will endeavor to
show how their analyses are incomplete and their bottom-line
positions untenable. While gleaning much from their work, we offer a
critique here that provides a foundation for the construction of our
second-generation functional account of foreign affairs federalism
discussed in Parts III and IV.
A. Formalist Approaches
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Arizona v. United States
succinctly encapsulates the formalist approach.106 Drawing on
Founding-era sources, his dissent proffers this categorical rule
grounded on “inherent” first principles of “sovereignty”: “[a state] has
the inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only
to those limitations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally
imposed by Congress.”107 To sustain this conclusion, Justice Scalia
draws further on constitutional text—implicitly invoking the canon of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius—to read Article I, Section 10’s
enumerated limits on state sovereignty as exhaustive.108 Scholarly
accounts of the formalist argument draw on those same sources,
contending that “the preemptive force of the national government
arises from Article VI and from specific exclusionary clauses
precluding state power” while denying the existence of a “generalized,
non-Article VI preemption in foreign policy matters.”109 Recognizing
that “state interference in foreign affairs may have negative
repercussions and may . . . even be on the whole a bad idea,”
formalists nonetheless insist that absent evidence that the Framers’

106. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–22 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2511.
108. Id. at 2512. Justice Scalia also relied on a postenactment history of immigration control
by the states. Id. at 2512–13. For this reason, Scalia’s approach cannot be glossed in terms of
textualism, but is better understood as an effort to derive formal categories from a combination
of text, interpretive principle, and history.
109. Ramsey, supra note 27, at 346; accord MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 264–82 (2007) (setting forth the basic structural and historical argument);
id. at 288–99 (extending that argument to claims of executive preemption).
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original solution is “so structurally irrational that no reasonable
person could accept it,” it remains binding.110
This Section develops reasons for resisting the formalist
approach. Although our own general methodological priors tilt in favor
of functionalism, we aim here to present objections that do not simply
reiterate those priors. Moreover, we emphasize that our rejection of
the formalist approach is not a backwardly induced consequence of
objections to its substantive conclusions. As will become clear, the
outputs from our proposed functionalist solution converge, to some
extent, with those of the leading formalist account.
The formalist position—best developed in a careful and
comprehensive article by Professor Ramsey—rests primarily on twin
claims about history and text. First, it asserts that Presidents
possessed limited foreign affairs authority pursuant to the
Constitution’s original design.111 Second, it asserts that the
Constitution supplies “no obvious text” on which to base a broad power
of executive preemption.112 We argue here that both claims are
debatable on the formalists’ own terms. In addition, we suggest a third
reason to repudiate formalism as a way to resolve the foreign affairs
federalism problem: formalism fails to explain how to “translate”
claims about eighteenth-century institutions into the twenty-first
century context.
Consider some objections to formalist accounts. First, scholars
reasonably disagree about the historical scope of independent
presidential foreign affairs authority at the Founding.113 There is no
easy way to resolve these disputes, and we doubt that judges are
uniquely well placed to select “winners.” Historical claims about
foreign affairs federalism as a practical matter do less to resolve legal
questions than to reframe them as open-ended debates over
ambiguous historical practices and fragmentary textual evidence.
Rather than resolving hard questions, adopting a formalist approach
110. Ramsey, supra note 27, at 346–47.
111. Id. at 396–403 (arguing that “the President, like Congress, is not explicitly granted a
general power over foreign affairs, and the President’s explicit foreign relations powers do not
seem broad enough to preempt much of the states’ foreign relations activity in non-military
contexts”).
112. Id. at 391.
113. Compare PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW 10–46 (2002) (advocating broad view of presidential authority), with Curtis A.
Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 545, 551–52 (2004) (arguing against a broad view on textualist and historical grounds);
accord Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54
UCLA L. REV. 309 (2006) (examining the executive’s constitutional authority in formal foreign
affairs and his ability to compel compliance).
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merely expands the pool of conflicting evidence by shifting the terrain
of debate.114 Formalists’ implicit assumption that Founding-era
sources converged on a single answer is also vulnerable in light of the
extensive, elaborate, and internally contradictory evidence they
themselves have surfaced, which attests to the existence of plural—
even competing—original meanings.
A historical lens on foreign affairs federalism questions,
moreover, creates paradoxes within the originalism frame. For
example, the leading formalist advocate of states’ primacy in foreign
affairs federalism, Professor Ramsey, is also a leading advocate of
ambitious readings of presidential foreign affairs authority.115 To
resolve the conflict between his strong claims on behalf of both the
President and the states, Professor Ramsey explains that “[t]he
President’s power is executive, which means, above all else, that it is
not legislative” and so cannot include “executive lawmaking power.”116
This distinction hardly avails judges confronted by actual conflicts. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist acutely observed in another context, the use
of “rigid categories” like “executive” and “legislative” offers little
resolving power when applied to the complex and dynamic forms of
contemporary government.117 Rather than addressing the underlying
problem, formalism generates a category-based rule whose application
is likely to yield arbitrary and ad hoc results, or alternatively, work
merely to obscure the application of first-order value judgments by
judges.
The second, textual element of foreign affairs formalism fares
no better. “Supremacy Clause textualism,” as it has been insightfully
labeled by Professor Henry Monaghan, is the idea that “the
Supremacy Clause is a trump, a decisive factor in constitutional
adjudication that (ordinarily) overrides every other consideration.”118
114. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
781 (2010) (“[A]ll forms of originalism seem . . . to assume much greater clarity about the original
understanding than in fact existed.”).
115. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234 (2001) (arguing that “the Constitution establishes a presumption
that the President will enjoy those foreign affairs powers that were traditionally part of the
executive power”); cf. id. at 255 n.97 (bracketing federalism concerns).
116. RAMSEY, supra note 109, at 289.
117. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 & n.28 (1988).
118. Monaghan, supra note 114, at 734, 740. For examples of Supremacy Clause textualist
claims, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1330 (2001) (arguing that “the Supremacy Clause recognizes only the ‘Constitution,’
‘Laws,’ and ‘Treaties’ of the United States as ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ ”); see also RAMSEY,
supra note 109, at 285–86; accord Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the
Supremacy Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1424–25 (2008) (arguing federalism is
designed to give political minorities power to prevent constitutional changes).
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It limits the domain of binding federal law to constitutional text,
statutes, and treaties. In foreign affairs, Supremacy Clause textualism
requires repudiating the use of sole executive agreements,119 as well
as restraining other forms of presidential authority, absent an
enacting statute or treaty. In the domestic context, it entails denying
legal force, at least in some instances, to the principle of stare decisis,
federal common law, and federal regulation.120 Quite apart from the
cogent methodological criticisms of Supremacy Clause textualism
others have developed,121 we find it improbable as a predictive matter
that the Court will embark on so radical a path. The practice of
judicial review cannot be untangled from its surrounding political and
institutional contexts.122 Historical experience makes it abundantly
clear that the Justices’ reach is necessarily tempered by willingness of
elected actors—wielding appointments and jurisdictional control—to
accept the exercise of judicial power.123 Simply put, Justices are
hedged in with plural ex ante and ex post institutional constraints by
the political branches. It is impossible to imagine the Court
abandoning all of the aforementioned features of our legal system as
advocated by Supremacy Clause textualists, if only because of the
sheer disruption to accepted practice it would cause. A claim about
constitutional interpretation that is impossible to implement in
practice supplies thin guidance to current federal courts.124
Our third objection concerns the relationship between claims
about eighteenth-century institutional arrangements and twenty-firstcentury doctrine. Many problems in constitutional interpretation
require courts to grapple with novel social, institutional, or

119. Clark, supra note 27, at 1575–76; accord Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and
the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 240 (1998).
120. Monaghan, supra note 114, at 756–65.
121. In particular, we find Professor Monaghan’s elegant brief against Supremacy Clause
textualism to be devastating. Id. at 756–81.
122. See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV.
1001 (2012) (analyzing enforcement-litigation gaps in terms of their effect on constitutional
values).
123. Id.; see also Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (2012)
(charting and explaining historical development of judicial review in terms of changing national
political forces). To be clear, we do not deny that the relevant institutional equilibrium is general
and not specific to particular cases. The Court thus often has considerable retail discretion, and
we also do not deny that the scope of this retail discretion is a function of how capable of
responding the political branches are, which might change over time.
124. Cf. Gillian Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. F. 98, 105 (2009) (arguing against the rejection of nontextual sources of
constitutional meaning on the ground that “the costs associated with [the resulting] disruption to
settled practice and precedent outweigh the asserted benefits of respecting constitutional
processes and compromise”).
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technological developments. Examples include the interaction of new
technology with the Fourth Amendment125 and the developing
understanding that flogging, a punishment considered acceptable at
the Founding, is cruel and unusual.126 In the foreign affairs context,
“the nature of international relations, and of the United States’ role in
such relations, ha[s] changed dramatically.”127 In response, the federal
executive developed over time military, diplomatic, and epistemic
competences that citizens of the early Republic could not have
imagined.128 Today’s executive branch is just a wholly different entity
from the skeletal staff that President Washington directed. History
has disrupted, and in some cases wholly transformed, categories such
as foreign and domestic, military and civilian, and war and peace,
upon which legal formalism tends to rely.
Further, the current understanding of federalism is
dramatically different; the Founding-era “belief that the division of
authority among levels of government should be determined according
to the subject matter at issue”129 contrasts with the contemporary
impossibility of drawing cogent and coherent divisions.130 To assume
categorical rules that worked a certain way under the dramatically
different institutional and geopolitical circumstances of the late
eighteenth century can be mechanically imposed on twenty-firstcentury institutions to the same effect and for the same reasons is to
make a large number of potentially unjustified assumptions.
The obligation to honor Founding-era principles under new
circumstances poses a challenge to the formalist jurist who seeks
“fidelity” to original understandings. Inevitably, she will find that her
normative commitments applied mechanically to new conditions can
generate erratic and even perverse results.131 Growing executive
125. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that police attachment
of a GPS tracker to a vehicle’s undercarriage was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes).
126. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861–82
(1989) (discussing, and rejecting, the constitutionality of flogging as used at the time of the
Founding on Eighth Amendment grounds).
127. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 29, at 1663; accord Schaefer, supra note 27, at
220–21 (asserting that a dormant foreign affairs doctrine makes sense in a post–Cold War
environment).
128. For a general account of relevant institutional trends, see Aziz Z. Huq, Imperial March,
DEMOCRACY, Winter 2008, at 44, 46–53 (summarizing historical trends).
129. ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 7 (2010).
130. See Roderick Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998)
(describing the demise of dual-sovereignty theories).
131. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 395, 403 (1995) (“[I]n at least some cases, a changed reading could be consistent with
fidelity. For some changed readings simply accommodate changes in context, by aiming to find a
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foreign affairs power, for example, might be commensurate with and
necessary to the robust defense of the Union that the Framers
defended and desired.132 But at the same time it might also undermine
the appropriate balance of powers in the federal system.133 Goals that
the Framers saw as equally important are now achieved by making
very different sorts of institutional design choices. Or consider how the
growing complexity of governance and increasing frequency of
emergencies in foreign affairs may push Congress toward increasingly
generous delegations of policy authorities, while at the same time
unraveling side constraints on the exercise of executive authority such
as congressional-oversight mechanisms.134 As a result, “the
executive . . . drives the policy agenda even where the cooperation of
other branches is needed for political reasons.”135 It is not clear this
tendency can be checked without limiting the federal government’s
capacity for effective action in the national-security and foreign affairs
domains.
In short, whereas the Framers could achieve multiple goals,
including efficiency and antityranny ends, in 1787 simply by enforcing
a rule of clear separation between Congress and the executive, today
those aspirations sometimes push simultaneously in opposite
directions. And where the Framers perceived the possibility of a stable
institutional equilibrium under the specific rules delineated in the
1787 Constitution, historical, socioeconomic, and institutional changes
have created new conflicts between policies designed originally to
work in tandem to secure constitutional goods. Worse, the
deliquescence of Founding-era intellectual certainties about the use of
subject-matter demarcations between the states and the federal
government means that it is no longer clear when or how federal
actions impinge on state autonomy. In ways that cannot be undone,

reading in the new context that has the same meaning as a different reading had in a different
context.”).
132. See PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 95 (1993) (“The move toward federal union
followed from the failure of confederal arrangements to guarantee harmony among the states
and Congress’s resulting inability to conduct foreign policy.”).
133. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727
(1996) (noting the Framers’ focus on Congress as the most dangerous branch, but then observing
that “[n]ever has the executive branch been more powerful, nor more dominant over its two
counterparts, than since the New Deal”).
134. For a useful account of how congressional oversight has foundered in respect to
intelligence issues, see AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 55–84 (2011).
135. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 8–12 (2010).
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time has sapped the intellectual foundations for many of the
justifications for legal formalism in respect to foreign affairs matters.
The transformative effect of historical and institutional
dynamics can render the endeavor of identifying categorical rules in
the Constitution’s text either irrelevant or at odds with some of the
Framers’ goals. In a world of broad delegations and frequent foreign
affairs emergencies, for example, the distinction between legislation
and execution of the law loses much of its coherence. It fails to account
for the complexity of government action and does little to advance the
values embodied in the original design. Furthermore, formalists face
an especially high justificatory burden in explaining why their (highly
contentious) version of fidelity to original meaning should trump the
immediate and compelling claims of those whose interests the
constitutional status imperils. The dead-hand problem immanent in
originalism is thus amplified in foreign affairs.136
Therefore, we find little reason to recommend a formalist
solution to problems of foreign affairs federalism. Rather, we submit
that until its advocates pay sufficient attention to its internal
paradoxes, its inconsistencies with current, broadly accepted practices,
and its deep normative difficulties, formalism will remain an
unattractive, ultimately unviable, approach. It is far better to grapple
openly with the practical problems of translating constitutional goals
identified in 1787 under the radically different institutional and
geopolitical conditions of today.
B. Functionalist Approaches
The functionalist view offers a more promising solution to
problems of foreign affairs federalism. The functionalist endeavors to
craft doctrinal rules of decision so as to maximize the attainment of
constitutional goods. Functionalists endeavor to attend closely to
institutional dynamics and predict how doctrinal assignments of
authority will either promote or subvert commonly shared goals.137
136. See generally Samaha, supra note 105, at 609 (elaborating problem).
137. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 200 (2006) (arguing that
the executive branch’s ability to act on new information absent a new case makes that branch
better suited to foreign affairs powers); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign
Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 154–55
(engaging in a “functionalist” approach by relying on institutional competence arguments); Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 865 (2007) (“In
emergencies, and in the areas of foreign policy and national security, even more discretion flows
to the executive because its institutional advantages in speed, decisiveness, force, and secrecy
become pronounced, and because power must be concentrated to meet threats.”). Many
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Rather than pursuing fidelity to the Constitution through rigid, ex
ante categorical suppositions, functionalists seek fidelity by
identifying the institutional and doctrinal conditions under which the
goals of the Constitution are most likely to be met under today’s
exigencies.
In the context of foreign affairs federalism, functionalism
supplies a methodological toolkit superior to formalism. We offer here
our own functionalist analysis. Ours, however, is not the first such
endeavor; it is therefore incumbent on us to explain why existing
functionalist approaches leave room for further analysis. Professors
Jack Goldsmith and David Sloss offer the two leading functionalist
accounts.138 Both provide important services by casting light on
necessary elements of a plausible functionalist analysis. Nevertheless,
in the balance of this Part, we explain why neither of these two
approaches adequately responds to the question addressed here: What
is the appropriate judicial presumption absent clear constitutional,
statutory, or treaty-based instructions in cases at the intersection of
federal affairs and federalism?
1. The “No-Presumption” Presumption
Consider first Professor Goldsmith’s influential functionalist
account of foreign affairs federalism. In his study of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,139
Goldsmith cannily zeroes in on the important question of what “the
proper interpretative default presumption” should be in the absence of
authoritative textual directions.140 Finding no justification for either a
pro-federal or a pro-states presumption, he contends instead that the
“prudent course is for courts to apply ‘ordinary’ principles of
preemption without any presumption in favor of state or federal law,”

functionalist arguments are little more than a recitation of the claim that the executive always
knows best. For a skeptical view of that claim, see Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as
Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 904–18 (2012).
138. A third functionalist inquiry, offered by Professor Schaefer, “would ask if the primary
purpose of the state law is to change or criticize the policy of a foreign government or
governments.” Schaefer, supra note 27, at 248–49. Absent some reason to think that legislative
motivations have an independent normative salience—as they arguably do in discrimination law
and the First Amendment—it is hard to discern a reason for organizing the jurisprudence around
so empirically slippery and analytically discredited a concept as legislative purpose. Cf. Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Congress Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L. REV. L. &
ECON. 239 (1992) (arguing that because Congress is comprised of many individuals with diverse
motivations, legislation rarely has a singular joint goal).
139. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
140. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 29, at 177.
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and to “preempt state law only on the basis of choices traceable to the
political branches in enacted law.”141
This nuanced and careful argument requires some unpacking.
In the first step of Goldsmith’s analysis, he rejects as unfounded both
the presumption against preemption and the presumption in favor of
federal control of foreign affairs. Goldsmith bases these dual rejections
partly on the difficulty of reconstructing congressional intent related
to preemption. Further, he argues, foreign affairs and domestic
questions are so entangled that it cannot be assumed federalism will
always be beneficial.142 The second step of Goldsmith’s analysis
assimilates rejection of these presumptions with what he labels a
“flight toward statutory interpretation.”143 Courts engaging in
statutory interpretation “eliminate from their bag of interpretive
sources any independent judicial consideration of the foreign relations
consequences of federalism.”144 They also “preempt state law only
when the justification for preemption is fairly traceable to . . . the
federal political branches.”145 Consistent with positions developed
elsewhere in his extensive corpus of scholarship,146 Goldsmith asserts
that the political branches tend to strike a desirable balance and that
judicial intervention will do more harm than good in foreign affairs.147
Applying this approach to the specific facts of Crosby, he identifies
Justice Souter’s opinion as an exemplar of his preferred minimalist
approach and endorses its analytic approach, which is characterized
as being rooted “self-consciously to the text and purposes of the
statute.”148

141. Id.
142. Id. at 181–95.
143. Id. at 201.
144. Id. at 201, 208.
145. Id. at 213.
146. Cf. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 29, at 1668 (denying judicial competence in
foreign affairs matters); id. at 1680–98 (“There is little reason to think that state control over
matters not governed by enacted federal law affects U.S. foreign relations in a way that warrants
preemption . . . . The political branches are quite capable of identifying and responding to any
adverse consequences of [state] behavior.”).
147. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 29, at 210 (claiming that
it is difficult for “courts to identify and weigh genuine U.S. foreign relations interests and to
balance the trade-offs of those interests against the benefits of state control”).
148. Id. at 215–21. To the extent that Goldsmith can be read to suggest that Crosby
presaged a minimalist judicial role in foreign affairs matters, his hopes have certainly been
dashed. As Part I demonstrated, cases as varied as Medellín, Garamendi, and Arizona have all
invoked presumptions of one sort or another in resolving foreign affairs federalism cases. A
predictive failure of this sort, of course, is not to be confused with an analytic shortfall and so
says little about the persuasiveness of Goldsmith’s underlying claims.
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Professor Goldsmith’s analysis accurately identifies many of
the factors that an account of foreign affairs federalism must address.
For example, he correctly points out that the substantial overlap of
foreign affairs and domestic matters makes any effort to delineate
separate domains of “dual sovereignty” infeasible. Additionally, he
rightfully considers institutional competence and error costs to be
central to any analysis. Nevertheless, we are skeptical about his
ultimate conclusion. Although several reasons to resist his analysis of
federalism and foreign affairs interests exist,149 we focus on the core of
his claim, which we call the “no-presumption” solution to foreign
affairs federalism problems, and explain we think why there is less to
it than first meets the eye.
As a threshold matter, consider why courts require a “proper
interpretative default presumption.”150 Courts most urgently need a
presumption in cases where constitutional text, federal statutes, and

149. We note in passing that some of Professor Goldsmith’s retail arguments are
unconvincing. Consider his three objections to the presumption against preemption—that it fails
credibly to track Congress’s likely preferences; that there is no federalism value at stake so long
as a federal law is within an enumerated power; and that the presumption is superfluous in light
of the Rehnquist Court’s revival of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 181–87. On the first
point, as Ernest Young and Matthew Stephenson have persuasively argued, canons are better
understood as mechanisms for promoting a constitutional value, rather than tracking
congressional preferences. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional
Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2 (2008)
(describing how clear statement rules enforce constitutional values by increasing the enactment
costs of particular types of legislation); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000) (proposing
“the concept of ‘resistance norms’—that is, constitutional rules that raise obstacles to particular
governmental actions without barring those actions entirely”). On the second point, Goldsmith
seems to assume a sharp divide between state and federal regulatory domains. Goldsmith,
Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 29, at 184 (“State sovereignty ends precisely at
the point to which federal power, properly exercised, extends.”). His own analysis of the overlap
between state and federal regulation interests, however, amply demonstrates that this picture is
somewhat misleading. In the domains in which state and federal regulatory interests overlap,
moreover, it is hardly nonsensical to suggest that a “resistance norm” (to use Young’s phrase) be
employed to ensure Congress does not incidentally or unintentionally trench on state regulatory
interests. Finally, Goldsmith’s reliance on Commerce Clause jurisprudence is a non sequitur.
Just because the Court is willing to enforce directly a policy value through one mechanism in one
domain does not mean it should not enforce the same value through a different mechanism in a
different statutory domain. The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence only sporadically
touches on most federal regulation. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New
Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2048 (2008) (emphasizing “the Court's unwillingness to curb
congressional regulatory authority on constitutional federalism grounds”). And as Justice Breyer
acutely noted, “the practical importance of preserving local independence, at retail . . . by
applying preemption doctrine with care” is wholly distinct, different, and arguably more
consequential than “the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress’ commerce clause power
at the edges.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 29, at 177.
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treaties fail to unequivocally supply an answer.151 In these instances,
courts need a “tie-breaker.”152 For questions of fact that are disputed
in a trial court, for example, the allocation of the burden of persuasion
serves as a tie-breaking rule. But questions of law are quite unlike
questions of fact. They cannot be decided merely by default in favor of
one of the litigants.153 Unlike decisions on facts, decisions on the law
have spillover effects from case to case that make prodefendant or
proplaintiff default rules implausible. Nor is randomization,
sometimes used to assign cases in the courts of appeals, a desirable
response to the problem.154 Few think the path of the law should be
calibrated by rolling a die.
As Part I demonstrated, moreover, the need for a tie-breaking
presumption of law arises in a meaningful proportion of cases. In
general, the legislative incentive to delegate strengthens as the
complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specificity
rise.155 Foreign affairs issues often raise such complex, difficult, and
costly questions. Consequently, over the past century, “many of the
grants of authority [enacted in foreign affairs have] become
increasingly vague and open-ended,” leaving ample room for
uncertainty and debate.156 Delegation in this area increased over the
second half of the twentieth century.157 Hence, the frequency of textual
ambiguity also increased, extending the crepuscular reach of Justice
151. See Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 746 (2004)
(“[T]he presumption [against preemption] is better understood as helping resolve a situation
involving conflicting evidence on statutory meaning.”).
152. Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal System: A National Perspective on
the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1061 (2001).
153. The doctrine of qualified immunity, pursuant to which judges defer to officials’ good
faith belief about the law, is an exception to this claim. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231–32 (2009) (holding qualified immunity applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a
clearly established constitutional right).
154. For a defense of randomization, however, see Adam Samaha, Randomization in
Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2009).
155. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
APPROACH TO POLICY-MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999) (modeling causes of
statutory delegations); see also Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory
of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–58 (1982) (arguing that Congress engages in
responsibility-shifting delegations so as to avoid blame for bad outcomes while claiming credit for
good outcomes). The Aranson et al. theory of delegation also predicts that textual ambiguity will
be rife in the foreign affairs context. Id.
156. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance,
119 YALE L.J. 140, 145 (2008). More generally, Professor Goldsmith’s optimism is at odds with
the pervasive possibility of semantic incoherence in legislation induced by cycling. See Saul
Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV.
971, 984–88 (1989) (describing briefly cycling and the underlying voting paradox in Parliament).
157. Hathaway, supra note 156, at 181–94 (describing postwar growth of executive power in
foreign relations).
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Jackson’s zone of twilight. It is precisely in these increasingly
frequently encountered cases that courts most urgently need a tiebreaking presumption. Requiring the court to decide whether there is
“fairly traceable” evidence of preemptive legislative intention evades
the core problem. Because of “institutional myopia and political
incentives”158 such intention—whether pro- or antipresumption—often
does not exist. In this light, Goldsmith’s approach yields nonsolutions,
not answers.
Moreover, it is simply no response to send judges back to the
study of “‘ordinary’ principles of preemption.”159 As one of the leading
treatments of preemption—and a source cited prominently by
Professor
Goldsmith160—says
pithily,
“Modern
preemption
jurisprudence is a muddle.”161 The Court’s decisions oscillate around
many important points of preemption doctrine based on the specifics
of the case considered. Consider this example: in the 2011 case of
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting the Court endorsed a “high
threshold” for any finding of implied conflict preemption in
immigration cases.162 In the very next term, the Court found sweeping
implied conflict preemption based largely on a presumption of federal
control of immigration.163 Further, the Court’s invocation and then
subsequent repudiation of a presumption against preemption in
express preemption clause cases has seemed arbitrary.164 These
pendular swings in approach and result from one case to another
render the law of preemption highly unstable and unpredictable. In
the most charitable light, it might be said that the Court’s preemption
jurisprudence responds to individual policy considerations and
circumstantial detail. More skeptically, it might be posited that the
latter jurisprudence is to date wanting in guiding principles. As a
result, directing federal judges not to consider foreign affairs
considerations and to treat a preemption dispute as ordinary is not at
158. Id. at 145.
159. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 29, at 177.
160. Id. at 182 n.36, 184 nn.42 & 46.
161. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000). Nelson’s view is widely
shared; for various reiterations over the past decades, see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085–86 (2000); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency
Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 524 (2012) (voicing a similar concern about the coherence of
preemption doctrine); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption
Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 256 (same).
162. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011).
163. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–09 (2012) (holding three of four
challenged sections of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement Act were preempted).
164. Compare Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (applying such a presumption),
with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (refusing to do so).
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all helpful. It simply begs the question of how an ordinary case should
be resolved in the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent.165
In any event, we think that Professor Goldsmith fails to take
an evenhanded approach as between the states and the federal
government. He declares that preemption demands “fairly traceable”
evidence of preemptive intent, but then imposes “a modest preference
for obstacle over field preemption.”166 This reinstalls, albeit sotto voce,
a mildly pro-state presumption against preemption. It leaves space in
the analysis for federalism considerations, but not for foreign affairs
values. This is assuredly not a no-presumption presumption: it is
simply an antinationalism presumption on stockinged feet.
In our view, this is not mere inconsistency on Goldsmith’s part.
Instead, it simply demonstrates the on-the-ground infeasibility of the
kind of no-presumption position he ostensibly espouses. When
statutory meaning is either underdetermined or ambiguous and yet
some resolution is needed, judges need something to break the
analytic logjam. Courts cannot flip a coin to determine the result in
such cases (at least in public). They need direction of some sort. Quite
clearly, a no-presumption approach offers no workable guidance.
When courts need a tie breaker, in other words, applying the
“ordinary” rules of preemption and a no-presumption presumption is a
fruitless enterprise. For this reason, Professor Goldsmith’s account
may fail to provide real assistance to judges. Rather, he leaves the
path open for a second-generation functionalist analysis.167

165. Is current preemption law any more of a “muddle” than other areas of the law? We
think so. There are many rules of law the application of which is relatively straightforward and
predictable, often because uncertainties have been ironed out in past litigation. Consider, by way
of somewhat random examples, the application of qualified and absolute immunities; the
availability of a Bivens remedy beyond the core cases already recognized; and the application of
state sovereign immunity. In each of these cases, an informed lawyer could give a confident
prediction about how a case would be resolved by either the Supreme Court or the courts of
appeals. We think this cannot be said of preemption doctrine.
166. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 29, at 213.
167. Professor Goldsmith describes Crosby as an exemplar of the no-presumption
presumption. Id. at 215–21. But it is not clear that the decision is accurately characterized in
those terms. In Crosby, the text of the statute was not squarely inconsistent with the state
action, and “no regulation was promulgated, no opinion letter issued, no administrative
adjudication undertaken—in short, the Clinton administration had taken no formal action
intended to preempt the Massachusetts law.” Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 171 (2001).
Arguably, a different result would have been reached “[o]utside the foreign affairs context.” Id. at
172; accord Carlos Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschering?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2001)
(arguing that “the [Crosby] Court’s preemption analysis was anything but ordinary” and is fairly
characterized as “narrow only if its approach to preemption were confined to suits implicating
foreign relations”).
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Before moving to Professor Sloss’s functionalist account, we
should also note here that some of the criticisms developed above also
bear on the substance of Professor Goldsmith’s assumptions about
institutional competence. As we have already noted, increased
legislative delegation of foreign affairs issues means that the courts
will be presented with a steady diet of disputes turning on ambiguous
or underdetermined texts.168 This casts doubt on Professor
Goldsmith’s claim that the political branches need no judicial help
because foreign policy disputes tend to be higher profile than their
domestic analogs.169 It is not the case that low salience is always a
barrier to congressional action. To the contrary, the higher the
salience of an issue, the more controversial the related politics—and
the more difficult it is to resolve the issue without delegation or
statutory ambiguity.170 As a result, it may be precisely because of the
high political salience of foreign affairs questions that Congress finds
them hard to resolve.
More generally, one might plausibly doubt Goldsmith’s implicit
assumptions about the nature of institutional choice. Perhaps useful
analysis does not start (as Goldsmith’s does) with the assumption that
one must make binary choices between the courts on the one hand and
the political branches on the other. Rather, it may be more productive
to think about how the various branches can interact to coproduce
public goods.171 For a variety of reasons, political actors might view
courts as complementary instruments in the joint production of public
policy even when their own epistemic competence is at a zenith.172 To
view courts as Goldsmith does—as competitors, rather than
collaborators, in the production of complex public goods—is hardly
necessary and often descriptively inaccurate.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 155–158 (noting that as legislative delegation
increases courts are faced with more ambiguous questions).
169. Goldsmith, Foreign Courts, supra note 29, at 1681–83; Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign
Affairs Preemption, supra note 29, at 191–92.
170. Consider in this regard the Food and Drug Administration’s struggle to regulate
tobacco, and the Court’s denial of such authority in the teeth of a fairly clear statement of agency
authority based on a mass of contrary legislative behavior. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–29 (2000) (finding that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco do not
fall within “combination products”).
171. Outside the foreign affairs context, scholars have emphasized how the realization of
constitutional rights has been the work of Congress and the courts acting in complex and
dynamic interactions. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1172–73 (2001) (focusing on realization of racial
equality interests).
172. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1443–
54 (2012) (cataloguing several different ways in which the political courts can manipulate
jurisdiction for epistemic ends or to minimize agency costs in the national-security domain).
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2. The (Faux) Political Safeguards of Federalism
Another leading functionalist approach, which is offered by
Professor Sloss, provides yet another general theory of judicial review
of foreign affairs federalism questions. Under this theory, judicial
review operates as a compensatory safety valve whenever the federal
political process fails to address federalism-related concerns.173 The
intensity of judicial scrutiny, therefore, is inversely proportional to the
effectiveness of federalism’s “political safeguards.”174 In emphasizing
the failings of the political process as a justification for judicial
intervention, Sloss follows John Hart Ely’s famous account of judicial
review as based on political process failure,175 while simultaneously
drawing on Herbert Wechsler’s famous account of the “political
safeguards of federalism.”176 That emphasis on the political process
leads Professor Sloss to distinguish between treaties, where
congressional involvement vitiates the need for judicial action, and
sole executive agreements, which compel more careful judicial
scrutiny because of the absence of congressional involvement.177 He
further draws on the Senate’s longstanding habit of incorporating
federalism conditions into treaties. Specifically, he argues that “the
disproportionate representation of small states in the Senate,
combined with the constitutional supermajority requirement for
treaties, suggests that the political safeguards inherent in the treaty
process” for all states’ interests make stringent judicial review
unnecessary.178 Although this analysis does not encompass
presidential action in the absence of a sole executive agreement—such
as in a case akin to Garamendi179—the theory readily extends to such
cases. With respect to such agreements, the absence of congressional
173. Sloss, supra note 29, at 1964 (“[T]he need for judicially created constitutional rules to
protect the states is inversely related to the degree of political safeguards inherent in the
different mechanisms for entering into international agreements.”).
174. For the coining of this term, see Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954) (describing how federalism guards against tyranny).
175. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73–104 (1980) (developing a processbased theory of individual rights protection).
176. Wechsler, supra note 174, at 552 (“Congress, from its composition and the mode of its
selection, tends to reflect the ‘local spirit’ predicted by Madison . . . .”).
177. Sloss, supra note 29, at 1970–72, 1984–87. His analysis extends to congressionalexecutive agreements, but the focus is more on the permissible subject-matter scope of such
agreements. Id. at 1988–95.
178. Id. at 1984–85. We note that Sloss’s argument might be turned on its head by arguing
that the disproportionate representation of small states in the Senate in fact is a cause for
concern because small states will tend to exploit unfairly large states.
179. 539 U.S. 396, 401–14 (2003).
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involvement would seem plainly to warrant a judicially enforced check
for federalism values.
This analysis offers an important core insight upon which we
build in subsequent parts of our argument: the idea that judicial
review is most valuable when other institutional mechanisms to
secure the same constitutional ends fail.180 Accounting for nonjudicial
mechanisms that enforce federalism values is clearly an important
part of any functional approach. In other ways, however, the analysis
is unpersuasive. First, Sloss’s account of the political safeguards is
incomplete.181 It cannot be assumed, as Sloss suggests, that the Senate
will defend federalism values merely because small states are
overrepresented. To be sure, the Senate’s deviation from per capita
representation “ensures small population states a disproportionately
large slice, and large population states a disproportionately small
slice, of the federal fiscal and regulatory ‘pie.’ ”182 This redistributive
effect183 reflects the influence of small states under the Articles of
Confederation—more specifically, their ability to secure a
disproportionate stream of rents—but it is not clear how it reflects any
federalism good.184 The Senate, that is, may “(possibly) give state and
local interests a greater voice in national politics,” but it does so in
“ways that do not necessarily protect state and local institutions.”185

180. Theories of judicial review based on political process have been criticized on the ground
that they lack a baseline for ascertaining when political-branch process is sufficient. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1073 (1980) (“[H]ow we are supposed to distinguish . . . ‘prejudice’ from principled, if
‘wrong,’ disapproval. Which groups are to count as ‘discrete and insular minorities’? Which are
instead to be deemed appropriate losers . . . ?”). This has some force, but a proponent of such
theories might respond that even in the absence of a baseline, theories based on political process
failure guide courts by providing information about where comparatively more or less judicial
investment is warranted, even if it cannot say precisely how much investment is ever needed in
any one place.
181. This point is developed in more depth infra in Part III.C.
182. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 476 (2003).
183. For empirical evidence of this effect, see Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities
and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 535–36 (2009) (listing per capita transfers for the ten
largest and smallest states).
184. For a discussion of possible definitions of federalism goods, see Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of
Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file
with authors).
185. Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 223 (2000); accord William H. Riker, The Senate and American
Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452, 455 (1955) (showing that the Senate has historically
failed to reflect states’ interests in any systematic way).
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Sloss offers some empirical evidence of federalism-related
treaty reservations,186 but the evidence does not bridge this theoretical
gap. Reservations to treaties do not necessarily demonstrate that
Senators are willing to expend political capital to preserve federalism
values. That reading would only be reasonable if the absence of such
provisos would have yielded intrusions on state sovereignty. It is not
clear that this is so. If the Court in Medellín v. Texas187 accurately
identified a prevailing presumption of non-self-execution, then
federalism-related provisions are a form of “cheap talk.” That is, they
are a means for Senators to genuflect to federalism concerns without
altering the legal status quo in any meaningful way. Alternatively,
federalism-related provisos can be explained by the Senate’s limited
willingness to tolerate international commitments—particularly
human rights commitments that the Senators historically have
perceived as intrusions on U.S. management of race relations.188 On
this view, federalism provisos are best explained not by federalism
concerns writ large, but by specific and localized dynamics unrelated
to state sovereignty per se.
A third possibility is that the Senate’s default approach to
international instruments is one of parochial, nationalistic suspicion
of foreign entanglements.189 Federalism-related provisos may be
merely one way to express a claim of American exceptionalism. In
short, absent further evidence such provisos are not persuasive
evidence of Sloss’s thesis.
Beyond his reliance on a now-discredited iteration of the
political safeguards of federalism, Sloss’s argument rests on a kind of
Nirvana fallacy.190 From the presence of putative political safeguards

186. Sloss, supra note 29, at 1985–86.
187. 552 U.S. 491, 519, 526 (2008) (relying on textual clues to determine a treaty’s selfexecution provisions).
188. Efforts to excise treaties from the Supremacy Clause during the 1950s, known
collectively as the Bricker Amendment, point toward the presence, at least in some periods, of
more general hostility to the binding effects of international law. Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria
McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts,
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 68–70 (2012).
189. Accord Kenneth Roth, The Charade of United States Ratification of International
Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 347 (2000) (arguing that the U.S. approach to
human rights treaties is characterized by “fear that international standards might constrain the
unfettered latitude of the global superpower, and arrogance in the conviction that the United
States, with its long and proud history of domestic rights protections, has nothing to learn on
this subject from the rest of the world”).
190. Cf. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 112 (2009) (“Scholars commit the nirvana fallacy when they identify a
defect in a given institution and then, based upon the perceived defect, propose fixing the
problem by shifting decisional responsibility somewhere else.”).
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in Congress, he deduces an absence of political safeguards in the
executive branch. But the second proposition does not follow from the
first. There may be complementary political safeguards within the
executive branch, and a claim about the appropriate calibration of
judicial review must account for that possibility. No less than the nopresumption presumption, therefore, Professor Sloss’s solution fails to
convince.
***
In this Part, we have aimed to demonstrate that the existing
scholarship fails to provide a persuasive resolution for conflicts
between federalism and foreign affairs values in the absence of
dispositive text. On the one hand, formalist approaches suffer from
internal incoherencies that render them particularly ill suited for
answering foreign affairs–related questions. On the other hand,
functionalist approaches employ the right tools, but the leading
functionalist accounts either rest on unconvincing predicate
assumptions or else fail to generate cogent solutions for judges. This
leaves the ground open for a “second generation” of functionalist
analyses.
III. THE CASE FOR DECENTRALIZING FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM
A. Developing a Judicial Presumption for the “Zone of Twilight”
In the following two Parts, we develop a “second-generation”
functionalist analysis to help courts resolve problems of foreign affairs
federalism in the absence of a dispositive text. We develop a
presumption to apply in cases where textual sources of domestic law
either fall short of supplying an answer or generate conflicting signals.
The analysis has two elements. First, we consider the arguments
against a pronational presumption and for a pro-state presumption
(the task of this Part). Second, we analyze the case for a pronational
presumption, and against a pro-state presumption (a question taken
up in the following Part). We aim to establish which of these
arguments is the more persuasive, and thus more appropriate,
foundation for a judicial presumption. As decisions such as Arizona v.
United States191 suggest, while a presumption provides only the
launching point for analysis, it can play a large role in determining
case outcomes.
We conclude that a uniform rule is inappropriate. To be more
specific, and to preview a point we make in greater detail in Part IV,
191. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497–511 (2012).
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we contend that the strength of the arguments in favor of centralizing
policy authority in the federal government varies as geopolitical
circumstances change. Emphasizing this relationship, we diverge from
many other scholars who posit a fixed judicial approach that turns out
to ill fit foreign affairs.
At the outset, we emphasize that the rule we offer here is a
default presumption designed to reflect the outcome rational parties
would have settled upon had they resolved the question by statute.192
We do not recommend what contracts scholars label a “penalty
default”193 and legislation scholars call a “preference eliciting”
canon.194 Such canons are justified when “the default result is more
likely to be reconsidered (and deliberated) by the legislature because it
burdens some politically powerful group with ready access to the
legislative agenda.”195 That is, they rest upon an assumption of stable,
predictable interest group dynamics.196 In the context of foreign affairs
federalism, however, the several states face many opposing interest
groups; these groups include immigrants and their domestic allies (in
Arizona197), multinational corporations (in Barclays Bank198 and
Garamendi199), and overseas claimants of domestic real property (in
Zschering). In some of these instances, states will likely prevail. In
some, they will more likely lose. It is thus implausible to expect a
consistent, context-invariant, public-choice account that points toward

192. An early and important law and economics account of statutory interpretation favors
preference-tracking default rules of statutory construction. See William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879
(1975) (arguing that courts enforce deals struck by interest groups in the form of laws). For the
purposes of this Article, we do not distinguish between the preferences of a historical enacting
Congress and those of a current Congress. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2084 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting
Statutory Default Rules] (drawing this distinction and favoring current legislators’ preferences).
But Elhauge includes pro-federalism canons somewhat akin to our ultimate recommendation
under this rubric. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2162, 2250–51 (2002) (discussing the federalism canon in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
461 (1991)).
193. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989).
194. Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, supra note 192, at 2165.
195. Id.
196. The description and analysis of interest-group dynamics in legislatures is the domain of
public choice scholarship. Cf. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 190, at 49–53 (summarizing
economic theory of regulation).
197. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2496–97 (2012).
198. 512 U.S. 298, 298–99 (1994).
199. 539 U.S. 396, 396–97 (2003).

1b. Abebe_Huq_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

762

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

4/23/2013 4:37 PM

[Vol. 66:3:723

the same outcome in all these cases.200 As a result, a preferenceeliciting rule may have erratic and occasionally deleterious
consequences in the foreign affairs federalism context.201
By contrast, a default rule that vindicates “policies [that] have
a source in widely held social commitments” can more easily be
justified in this context.202 By way of example, in several cases the
Court applied a default presumption in the course of statutory
interpretation in order to vindicate federalism values.203 This default
has been applied across a variety of contexts: regulatory preemption
cases, which concern the states’ ability to set primary conduct rules,
and one nonpreemption (bankruptcy) case, which concerned the states’
power to define property interests.204 This shows that preferenceestimating default rules can be stable and widely applied with
relatively little burden on courts. Another reason to prefer a default
presumption based on “widely held social commitments” is that the
outcome of judicial intervention is likely to stick as a result of
legislative inertia,205 endowment effects,206 and the expressive side
effects of judicial action.207 The balance of our discussion assumes the
appropriate presumption is one that reflects the most likely desired
outcome—a preference-enforcing rather than a preference-eliciting
canon.

200. But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007) (proposing an antipreemption
default rule as a way of promoting “an open and vigorous debate on the floor of Congress”).
201. Further, it will be difficult for courts to identify any subcategory of cases in which a
preference-eliciting rule is warranted. See Elizabeth Garrett, Preferences, Laws, and Default
Rules, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2104, 2137 (2009) (arguing that “the institutional capacity of judges to
apply the preference-eliciting canons seems particularly questionable”).
202. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 334.
203. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203–06 (2009)
(invoking federalism as a reason to narrowly construe the Voting Rights Act); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (applying pro-federalism canon to limit intrusions on state
government functions).
204. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (reading federal
bankruptcy statute in light of state property law norms); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (discussing presumption against preemption).
205. Cf. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1253 (1999)
(noting “legislative inertia,” even on foreign affairs–related matters, in Congress).
206. For a defense of preference-estimating canons along these lines, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 649–50 (1999) (noting that
default rules can affect the preferences of relevant actors). Moreover, canons are a way to ensure
that “existing understandings” are not changed “any more than is needed to implement the
statutory objective.” David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992).
207. Sunstein, supra note 206, at 649–50 (noting that “background rules can affect the
judgments, beliefs, and preferences of the parties”).
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In this Part, we take up the first element of the analysis—the
case in favor of state control and against federal control—while the
next Part considers the opposite argument. Then we assess the
balance of the arguments and explain our proposed default
presumption.
B. The Costs of Centralization in Foreign Affairs Federalism
While the value of federal control over foreign affairs–related
matters is well established, the extent to which the policy questions in
the cases detailed in Part I implicate states’ interests is less clear.
Absent some reason to value states’ continuing involvement in such
policy matters, a strong presumption in favor of federal control would
obviously be desirable.208 Therefore, in order to demonstrate that there
is not a simple desirable presumption in favor of the federal
government in all cases, we first identify the goods typically associated
with state-level action in a federal structure and consider whether
they translate to the foreign affairs domain. After identifying reasons
to preserve the states’ role even when foreign affairs concerns are in
play, we ask whether national institutional mechanisms adequately
protect state sovereignty.
A threshold problem arises when analyzing the benefits of
state involvement in the underlying policy questions in the foreign
affairs federalism cases discussed in Part I. There is an absence of any
convergent understanding in American constitutional theory of the
proper role of the states.209 Deontic accounts of federalism have
periodically been fashionable. It is possible, for example, to identify a
state’s “sovereignty” as a central value, as Justice Scalia does in
Arizona v. United States.210 We reject this approach. The historical
concept of sovereignty, which on some accounts derives from
predemocratic notions of governance and international law,211 is
208. Michael McConnell has noted that this question about the continuing role of the states
can be asked more generally. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491 (1987) (“That the states should retain substantial
independent authority is not self-evident.”).
209. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 439 (2002) (“There is no agreed-upon definition of
constitutional federalism.”).
210. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The preeminent purpose
of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities.”).
211. Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1923 (2003) (describing the Court’s
use of dignity in analyzing federalism interests as “a return to an older conception of the

1b. Abebe_Huq_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

764

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

4/23/2013 4:37 PM

[Vol. 66:3:723

undertheorized. Given the complex context in which disputes about
federal displacement of state policy choices arise, the concept of state
sovereignty therefore does little independent analytic work.212 It is too
ductile to discipline judges’ substantive preferences. As a result, it
seems to us that the question whether state sovereignty is impinged
will often be in the eye of the beholder.
We focus, instead, on a consequentialist account of federalism:
how does a federal structure promote goods such as liberty, welfare,
and self-government that the Constitution promises? Even so
narrowed, impressive complexities remain even when formulating the
question. The Court’s federalism jurisprudence recognizes several
forms of state autonomy. These forms include: regulatory autonomy
(i.e., the ability to establish policy through the imposition of rules of
decision upon private transactions and behaviors);213 financial
autonomy (i.e., control over their own purses);214 and the independent
operation of state political institutions (i.e., governors and state
legislatures).215 Different species of federal action therefore implicate
varied regulatory, fiscal, and political autonomy interests to divergent
degrees.
We believe that foreign affairs–based ousters of state policy
choices most commonly come at a cost to states’ regulatory autonomy,
but do not directly compromise states’ fiscal or political integrity.216 As
a result, our analysis of foreign affairs federalism is focused solely
upon state regulatory autonomy, and not fiscal or political
independence.

sovereign” under monarchical rule); cf. Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in CrossDoctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2003) (suggesting that the concept of state
sovereignty should be given meaning by drawing on international law).
212. Cf. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 151 (1993) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (calling the dignity rationale “embarrassingly insufficient”).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries
between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would
become illusory.”).
214. Fallon, supra note 209, at 445 (noting the role of fiscal concerns in the Court’s
federalism jurisprudence).
215. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–75 (1992) (protecting state
legislatures from “commandeering”).
216. Federal ouster of state regulatory authority might have either a positive or a negative
effect on states’ fisc. On the one hand, the substitution of federal for state regulatory authority
lowers states’ expenditures. On the other hand, federal regulatory preemption coupled with
federal underenforcement might leave or create a situation in which a policy problem imposes
costs on the state, but where the state cannot directly mitigate those costs. Immigration might be
one such case.
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With that caveat in mind, we delineate the central focus of our
inquiry in this Part: When does it matter that states have some
effectual measure of autonomous regulatory power? The division of
regulatory authority between the national government and
subnational entities is typically thought to generate four important
goods. We outline these four goods and point to some theoretical or
empirical evidence in each instance for thinking that state autonomy
is welfare enhancing. Before enumerating these goods, we hasten to
clarify that is not our aim here to embark on the onerous task of
mounting a full-scale consequentialist defense of federalism. 217 That
is, in specifying these four goods, we implicitly accept for the purposes
of this analysis that the canonical approaches to federalism are not
wide off the mark. We do not attempt to disregard the aggregate
results of past economic and political science analyses of federalism,
which identify at least some social welfare benefits from
decentralization. Rather, we accept the following well-established
results as a baseline for analysis (i.e., that federalism does tend to be
valuable in at least four ways) and then ask whether there is any
reason to diverge from that approach.218
First, regulatory decentralization is posited as a catalyst for
greater governmental responsiveness to divergent interests and
preferences.219 Since a national policy is almost inevitably
characterized by heterogeneous preferences and interests,
“[f]ederalism eliminates the need for a one-size-fits-all policy.”220 This
means that different subnational units can adopt different regulatory
regimes. And as a result, more individuals will be able to migrate
between states in order to find the bundle of policies that best matches
their preferences.
Second, subnational units are thought to be more likely to
identify fiscally efficient policies because they have an incentive to

217. Note that we list here only the potential benefits of decentralization. We do not claim
that decentralization does not have detriments—such as destructive races to the bottom and
spillover effects—only that they are not relevant to the current point. For a comprehensive
taxonomy and analysis of both costs and benefits, see JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION:
PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 25–52 (2009) (outlining both benefits and problems with federalism).
218. We are grateful to Alison LaCroix for pressing us to clarify our thinking on the
relationship between the standard welfarist defenses of federalism and our approach to foreign
affairs federalism.
219. McConnell, supra note 208, at 1493–94. Note the assumption in what follows—and
indeed in the political science literature on federalism more generally—that states wish to
attract more residents. We accept that assumption, but note that its theoretical and empirical
foundations are not pellucid.
220. BEDNAR, supra note 217, at 45–46.
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compete for populations.221 For example, subnational units are more
motivated than national governments to deliver essential services
efficiently. Efficient delivery helps the unit attract residents through
lower taxes.222 National legislators, on the other hand, are tempted to
engage in pork-barrel spending to benefit their local constituents at
the expense of the general fisc.223 This fiscal effect goes beyond the
welfare gain that comes from better sorting of individuals to policy
bundles.
Third, regulatory competition has the potential to create
“greater opportunity and incentive [for subnational units] to pioneer
useful changes” through experimentation.224 Wisconsin’s experiments
with welfare and Massachusetts’s health-care reforms are recent
examples of innovation that spread to the national level. It is possible
to argue that in both instances state innovation was beneficial because
it opened the door to national policymaking.
Fourth, and finally, it is argued that regulatory autonomy of
subnational units is necessary to protect individual liberties against
potential national overreaching.225 The “inherent fragmentation” of
federalism makes it more difficult for a potential national tyrant to
221. Jonathan A. Rodden, Federalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
357, 360 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006) (describing the “competitive
federalism” thesis as the claim that “under decentralization, a government must compete for
mobile citizens and firms, who sort themselves into the jurisdiction that best reflects their
preferences for bundles of governmental goods and policies”). The disciplining mechanism here is
migration by populations between states, otherwise known as Tiebout sorting. Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (arguing that a
market in local government services, created by federal structure, allows individuals to “vote
with their feet” in ways that could under certain ideal conditions generate efficient allocations of
public goods). We should emphasize, however, that Tiebout’s formal model has demanding
preconditions that in practice are rarely met, and so sorting will not secure all possible efficiency
gains. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models of Local Government: Exit, Voting, and the
Land Market, 6 J. URB. ECON. 319 (1979). Moreover, Tiebout sorting can be driven by wealth
effects rather than by preferences. Stephen Calabrese, Dennis Eppel, Thomas Romer & Holger
Sieg, Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 959, 960
(2006).
222. BEDNAR, supra note 217, at 55.
223. Cf. id. 46–47 (noting that “large-population republics do not provide as many public
goods” as federations, and that “[w]hen national legislators represent particular districts, there
is a potential for overprovision”). Federalism can also have a “market-preserving effect” because
interjurisdictional competition “solves the problem of the state that steals from its citizens.” Id.
at 43.
224. BEDNAR, supra note 217, at 50–51 (noting that experimentation works only if
subnational units share the same goal); McConnell, supra note 208, at 1498.
225. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the
federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28,
at 205–07 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed., 1987) (arguing that “the State governments
will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasion of the public liberty
by the national authority”).
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seize control.226 Along similar lines, subnational units provide
“alternative locations of independently derived government power.”227
Minority interest groups otherwise excluded from the national process
need not stand perpetually on the sidelines in a federal polity such as
the United States. Rather, such groups can try to influence
subnational units as a first step in a national campaign.228 In this
way, states are styled as perennially important sites for political
mobilizations against lock-ups of national political power.229 To the
extent that “decentralization in the United States is a function of, and
bound up with, federalism,”230 these benefits arguably cannot be
replicated by regions or cities.
All this shows that in the ordinary course a division of
regulatory authority between the states and the national government
has welfare benefits. The key question for our purposes, however, is
whether these goods obtain in roughly the same measure in those
policy domains touched by foreign affairs concerns. The short answer
is that most of the positive goods of federalism obtain when there is a
foreign affairs interest. Consequently, there is no reason to repudiate
federalism-related interests merely because they involve a matter of
foreign relations.231 The exception is fiscal efficiency, the second virtue
of decentralization listed above. The creation of fiscal efficiencies
through intergovernmental competition has no clear analog in the
foreign affairs domain.232 This suggests that at least on one margin,
regulatory decentralization is less important to the states when there
are foreign affairs questions at stake.
226. BEDNAR, supra note 217, at 49–50. It bears noting that federalism may also enable
local tyrannies, as the history of American race relations amply demonstrates.
227. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2218 (1998).
228. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1551–52 (1994)
(noting stepping stone function).
229. See Jackson, supra note 227, at 2219 (“[S]tates need not threaten the use of military
force in order to provide structures for development and organized expression of countervailing
positions to those of the national government.”). Indeed, the several states have been playing this
role since the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions.
230. Id. at 2217.
231. Note that this argument is distinct from Goldsmith’s observation that foreign and
domestic affairs overlap. That might be true, and still the presence of a foreign affairs connection
might somehow obviate or dilute the states’ interests.
232. One possible domain for such efficiency is foreign aid. We might, for example, imagine a
localized foreign aid system that drew on the epistemic competence and affiliative interests of
different ethnic and national groups with foreign ties in different states to make decisions about
where foreign aid should go—imagine USAID run a la Medicaid. Such a radically decentralized
model arguably would have advantages as compared to a centralized system, which may be more
vulnerable to political and institutional distortions and thus less faithful to democratic
preferences. We are grateful to Tom Ginsburg for raising this example.
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Nevertheless, the remaining three arguments in favor of
regulatory decentralization do apply to the foreign affairs federalism
context. To begin with, the several states may accommodate the
national population’s varied preferences on foreign affairs issues
better than a single national policy. On some foreign policy issues, to
be sure, there may be no obvious way to increase preference
satisfaction through decentralization (e.g., military deployments). On
many other issues, though, it may be possible. For example, it may be
entirely feasible to comply with diverse preferences on the question of
corporate taxation at stake in Barclays Bank or the appropriate
domestic attitude toward those who deal with repressive foreign
governments in Crosby through the decentralization of policy choices
to the states.233
When states have concentrated groups with distinct powerful
stakes in foreign relations,234 it is hard to see any a priori reason to
prevent these groups from expressing their most pressing and deeply
felt political preferences through the state as well as the federal
government. Indeed, the unusual intensity of the group preferences
may further justify the availability of multiple forums in which those
preferences can be expressed. Hence, in Garamendi, the Court noted
the presence of several thousand Holocaust survivors in California,
and yet it failed to attribute any significance to that fact.235 We believe
it erred in this respect. Opening states as forums for the expression of
their preferences may be more desirable than readily engineered
alternatives.236
233. Preferences can vary over whether or when international law should trump state law.
See Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2388–92 (2006) (describing
governors’ divergent reactions to International Court of Justice rulings on American death
penalty cases).
234. In many states, for example, there are population concentrations defined by ethnic or
national origin with narrowly defined interests. To select an example proximate to the authors,
there is a large Burmese community in northern Indiana with strong views about U.S. policy
toward Myanmar.
235. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425–26 (2003) (noting the presence of
“roughly 5,600 documented Holocaust survivors” in California, but also criticizing “the weakness
of the State’s interest . . . in regulating [the insurance industry for the purpose of mitigating its
reliance on profits gained through exploitation of the Holocaust]”). The Court’s failure here is
made more egregious by the compelling normative interests on the side of Holocaust survivors,
but the point has more general application. Consider, for example, the Apartheid-related
divestiture movement. See Note, State and Local Anti-South African Action as an Intrusion upon
the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 815 (1986) (discussing state, county,
and municipal actions restricting trade with South Africa).
236. Bans on vote trading mean that intensely held preferences cannot be satisfied through
buying others’ stakes in a single political forum, making the multiplicity of forums a useful
means of allowing citizens to register intensity. For an illuminating account of the connection
between intensity of preferences and bans on vote trading, see Saul Levmore, Voting with
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To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that state-level
regulatory action will always be justified or that it should be
absolutely immune from federal ouster. An interest group, defeated on
the national level but successful on the state level, may well pursue
interests that are sufficiently antithetical to the national interest to
warrant preemption.237 Rather, our point is that local preferences over
foreign policy questions are a priori valid, and that they clearly count
in favor of decentralization.
Furthermore,
the
potential
for
innovation
through
experimentation obtains at the state level as much in the foreign
affairs domain as it does in the domestic sphere. Of course, not all
foreign policy issues allow experimentation—again, military
deployments may be a good example from contemporary policymaking.
In many instances, though, state-level experimentation might be
valuable to the whole nation. The worldwide combined reporting
scheme at issue in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, for
example, arguably tested a potentially valuable means of preventing
tax evasion that was more feasible by alternative accounting
approaches.238 The facts of Barclays Bank further suggest the value of
experimentation can outweigh foreign relations costs. In that case,
foreign governments, including the United Kingdom, had either
threatened or enacted retaliatory legislation aimed not just at
California corporations but all U.S. corporate entities.239 Yet Congress
decided only to “stud[y] state taxation of multinational enterprises,”
but not to use its unquestioned Foreign Commerce Clause authority to
impose uniformity.240
In addition, state experimentation may be preferable to the
alternative where Congress acts as the arena for contestation of
executive foreign policy choices. For example, state-level efforts by
Armenian Americans to seek recognition of and recompense for the
large-scale human rights violations committed by the Turkish state at
the beginning of the twentieth century have proved less disruptive to

Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 113 (2000) (“The obvious question in the case of voting rights is
whether intense preferences can be accommodated without shifting enormous power to wealthier
citizens.”).
237. In particular, problems of multiple taxation may render state interventions
problematic. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (invalidating
application of ad valorem property tax on foreign shipping).
238. 512 U.S. 298, 305 (1994) (noting that the alternative approach of separate accounting
“poses the risk that a conglomerate will manipulate transfers of value among its components to
minimize its total tax liability”).
239. See id. at 324 n.22 (describing retaliatory measures).
240. Id. at 324–26.
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foreign relations than parallel efforts at the congressional level.241 The
lower salience of states, that is, may allow for the vindication of
democratic values without excessive disruption of executive foreign
policy initiatives.
To reinforce this point, we flag another California measure that
illustrates the virtues of state-level experimentation. The Holocaust
Victim Insurance Relief Act,242 which was invalidated in American
Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, innovatively approached an intractable
international problem and a grave historical injustice: Holocaust-era
profiteering. In early negotiations with the German government, U.S.
representatives found ways to accommodate the possibility of such
independent action by subnational actors.243 It is indeed plausible that
in such negotiations, the existence of subnational actors—willing to
act aggressively if a certain deal is not struck—even endowed the
American executive with greater capacity to extract favorable
compromises.244 Experimentation, that is, may be directly valuable by
revealing new policy options, but also may be indirectly valuable by
influencing the dynamics of international negotiations. Yet the
Supreme Court perceived insufficient value in the California law and
held it preempted.
The fourth and final benefit of state regulatory autonomy spills
over into the foreign affairs domain. Even the small sample of
disputes reaching the Supreme Court demonstrates how states play
an important role as “alternative locations of independently derived
government power.”245 Consider Massachusetts’s sanctions on
companies trading with Burma.246 Three months after Massachusetts

241. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that there was no conflict between
U.S. federal policy regarding the Armenian genocide and a California statute extending the
statute of limitations for claims of descendants of Armenians involving insurance policies
purchased by their ancestors prior to 1923. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901
(9th Cir. 2010).
242. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800–07 (West 2003).
243. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405–06 (2003) (describing early
negotiations).
244. For a more general theory of the importance of domestic constraints in international
negotiations, see Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988) (discussing entanglement of domestic and international
politics).
245. Jackson, supra note 227, at 2218. For an argument that this kind of state regulatory
role is functionally inevitable in the immigration context, see Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigrant Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 572 (2008) (advocating
an integrated approach to immigration reform that involves both states and the federal
government).
246. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000) (describing 1996
Mass. Acts 239, ch. 130).
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enacted its Burma law, Congress enacted its statutory framework.247
On one view, this timing is suggestive of Congress’s alacrity in
responding to any state action that threatens to destabilize
international relations. On another—and perhaps more compelling—
view, the Burma case study highlights the ability of a state to catalyze
national action. Although the federal law employed different
regulatory tools—rejecting, for example, the state’s secondary
boycott—the sequence and proximate timing of the two enactments
hint at how states can identify foreign policy matters that might
otherwise remain outside Congress’s limited span of attention. Crosby
shows how minority interest groups, while unable to access the
national political process, can nonetheless bring specific policy
questions to national salience.
Massachusetts’s law is not an outlier. States have long been
involved “in a wide variety of activities with international aspects,
ramifications or consequences.”248 In many of these domains, the
states may blaze a trail, providing other subnational units—and even
the federal government—with evidence of the consequences of a given
policy change.249 Implementation of innovative policies on a smaller
scale incurs lower start-up and failure costs. Again, the point is not
that state policy innovation is so important that it necessarily trumps
any federal interest. Rather, the point is that there is no reason to
assume that the judicial protection of state regulatory autonomy is
any less justified because it arises in a policy domain that touches on
foreign relations concerns.
With the exception of one efficiency-related argument, we have
argued there is no reason to discount the federalism interest merely
because it intersects with a foreign affairs concern. It follows that
there remains a case for institutional safeguards of federalism in
respect to foreign affairs questions (at least assuming that the
standard welfarist case for some federal-state division of regulatory
authority holds).

247. See id. at 368 (noting timeframe between Massachusetts law and Congressional action).
248. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L.
821, 821–22 (1989) (describing economic efforts partnerships, immigration-related policies, and
South Africa–related divestiture policies).
249. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism
and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 56–57
(2007) (documenting state and local action to implement the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women); id. at 60–62 (same for climate change).
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C. The Political Safeguards of Foreign Affairs Federalism (Revisited)
Judicial protection of federalism interests does not turn solely
on whether states have a valid regulatory interest when federalism
and foreign affairs intersect. States, as James Madison noted, were
envisaged by the Framers as no mere bit player in the national drama;
they are instead “constituent and essential parts of the federal
government,” with “each of the principal branches of the federal
government [owing] its existence more or less to the favor of the State
governments.”250 State involvement in the “federalist political process
might more effectively promote the . . . substantive values federalism
is supposed to serve than any attempt to enforce those values
directly.”251 At the very least, a theory of judicially enforced federalism
must account for the role that the states already play in federal
government when gauging the appropriate scope of judicial solicitude
for federalism values.252 The more effectively that nonjudicial means
protect states’ interests, the less need exists for a presumption in favor
of the states’ interests in foreign cases.253
To estimate the efficacy of nonjudicial mechanisms for
vindicating federalism values, we build upon and strive to deepen
Professor Sloss’s analysis of the “political safeguards” of foreign affairs
federalism.254 Whereas Sloss’s argument begins and ends with the
House and the Senate, we consider a broader range of institutional
safeguards. To that end, we focus on the possibility (not addressed by
Professor Sloss) that the executive branch also contains mechanisms
to shelter states’ interests. We conclude, based on this enlarged
inquiry, that political safeguards of foreign affairs federalism are
likely to be fragile. This means that a judicial supplement remains
useful. The constitutional interest in federalism prima facie justifies a
presumption favoring the preservation of state regulatory authority
under certain conditions. This conclusion leads us to further inquire as
250. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 294–95 (James Madison) (I. Kramnick ed., 1987).
251. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 374.
252. Cf. BEDNAR, supra note 217, at 132 (“[Judicial and political s]afeguards also bolster one
another’s performance and stand in where others are weak.”).
253. This assumes that “federalism . . . must operate so as to keep centrifugal and
centripetal forces in rough equipoise,” Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and Separation of
Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1092 (2011), notwithstanding changed circumstances that, as a
matter of first principles, might justify a rebalancing of authority between national and
subnational units. We accept arguendo the stipulated goal of “rough equipoise” as a restatement
of the commonly accepted views of American federalism; we do not mean (at least here) to
suggest there are no reasons to doubt this common wisdom.
254. See supra Part II.A.
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to whether and when the federal interest in centralized foreign affairs
authority should be prioritized—a question we take up in the
following Part.
As a threshold matter, we emphasize once more that the
narrow focus of our inquiry in this Article is Justice Jackson’s zone of
twilight, a domain in which textual direction and congressional intent
are not readily available.255 In each of the cases discussed in Part I, it
was unclear if Congress had spoken to a particular legal question. For
this reason, three canonical accounts of political safeguards can be
discarded as irrelevant at the outset. First, the Framers identified
direct action by the states as an “obstacle[] to [federal] usurpation and
the facilities of resistance” through military force.256 This obviously
has little practical importance today when the states maintain no
effectual military resources. Second, the Framers assumed that
“Congress, from its composition and the mode of its selection, [would]
ten[d] to reflect the ‘local spirit’ predicted by Madison.”257 The Framers
accordingly spoke of the Senate as a “representation . . . of the
States.”258 Further, they imagined that linking voting qualifications
for the House to voting qualifications for a state’s most numerous
branch259 would ensure representatives would consistently vote in
alignment with state interests.260 Even if these mechanisms work—a
matter of considerable debate today261—they are irrelevant when
there is no clear evidence of congressional action.
Third, contemporaneous efforts to revive the Founding-era
account of political safeguards point to the way in which “national and
local political parties engender ‘a political culture in which members of
local, state, and national networks are encouraged, indeed expected, to
work for the election of candidates at every level’ in a way that
‘promotes relationships and establishes obligations among officials
that cut across governmental planes.’ ”262 However, these efforts are
255. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
256. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 225, at 206.
257. Wechsler, supra note 174, at 552.
258. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 394 (James Madison) (I. Kramnick ed., 1987); accord
Wechsler, supra note 174, at 547–48 (discussing the Senate’s role in protecting state interests).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (linking state electoral qualifications to federal electoral
qualifications).
260. See Wechsler, supra note 174, at 548–49 (noting that states’ power to fix voting
requirements provided some state control over the House).
261. See Kramer, supra note 185, at 223–27 (arguing that Wechsler’s approach provides
insufficient safeguards for federalism).
262. See BEDNAR, supra note 217, at 113–16 (describing a theory of political safeguards and
noting its weakness—because of parties’ “motivation is to win elections” their actions will not
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not salient here because parties largely depend on Congress for the
vindication of federalism’s values in national politics. In short, both
traditional and contemporary iterations of the political-safeguards
argument fail in the zone of twilight where many foreign affairs
federalism cases arise.
Yet this does not mean that we should wholly abandon the
political-safeguards argument. Recent scholarship in administrative
law shows “executive agencies generally have significant incentives to
take state concerns seriously.”263 In stark contrast to “Congress[,
which] proves, in actuality[] to be nearly indifferent to those
committed to state regulatory interests,” federal administrative
agencies have been labeled by some commentators “the best possible
protectors of state regulatory interests.”264 The evidence of agency
solicitude for federalism values has been decidedly mixed until now.265
Even so, scholars offer three general reasons to rely on internal
executive processes as “political safeguards,” and to develop more
robust agency structures to ensure federal regulatory efforts consider
state interests.266
First, agencies use mandatory notice-and-comment periods for
rulemaking. Compared to the opaque negotiation and drafting
processes on Capitol Hill, notice-and-comment rulemaking provides
states with more advanced notice and a better opportunity to raise
concerns about proposed regulations.267 The formal structure of notice-

always converge with what is required to defend federalism-related goods); Kramer, supra note
185, at 279; id. at 282 (“The political dependency of state and federal officials on each other
remains among the most notable facts of American government.”).
263. Mendelson, supra note 151, at 741; accord Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld,
Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal
Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1939, 1948–83 (2008) (arguing that “for the most part, agencies
outperform” other federal branches as allocators of policy-setting power); Sharkey, supra note
161, at 527–28 (finding, based on interviews with agency staff, the “continu[ed] significance of
agency participation in preemption, especially in the rulemaking context”).
264. Catherine Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE
L.J. 2125, 2127–28 (2009).
265. See Mendelson, supra note 151, at 783 (finding that “agencies tend to identify possible
federalism implications only rarely”); accord Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 695–718 (2008) (discussing lack of institutional competence
of agencies in preempting state law); Sharkey, supra note 161, at 527 (noting rarity of federalism
impact statements in agency-issued rules).
266. In particular, Professor Catherine Sharkey has developed a quiver of reforms designed
to promote the administrative safeguards of federalism. See Sharkey, supra note 161, at 570–95
(recommending deeper consultation, reporting requirements, and review procedures); accord
Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 263, at 1974 (“[A]gencies frequently underprotect federalism
values by a little, whereas Congress either over- or underprotects them greatly.”).
267. See Mendelson, supra note 151, at 777–78 (explaining benefits states receive from
notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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and-comment rulemaking also hinders agency officials from ignoring
or evading state interests. By contrast, since legislators manage a
broader portfolio of responsibilities and require fundraising, they may
focus on wealthy interest groups to the detriment of the states. This
frequently results in greater sensitivity to state regulatory concerns
by agencies than by Congress.268 In addition, states can avail
themselves of regulatory review by the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”); states frequently request meetings with OMB on
significant rules that affect their regulatory agendas.269
Second, the White House promulgates executive orders and
memoranda to promote agency consideration of federalism interests.
The most recent presidential memorandum directs agencies to
undertake preemption “only with full consideration of the legitimate
prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for
preemption.”270 The associated executive order requires agencies to
implement “an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely
input by State . . . officials.”271 The order also instructs agencies to
generate “a federalism impact statement” whenever regulations have
“substantial direct effects on the States” or preempt state law.272
Third, some executive agencies “maintain cooperative
relationships with states” because the latter help in the
implementation of federal statutory policies.273 Such cooperative
federalism schemes provide opportunities for states to assert their
regulatory interests within the framework of a larger regulatory
program.274 Cooperative federalism often fosters close relationships
between states and federal agencies. These relationships may reduce
268. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 264, at 2150–52 (documenting how agencies were more
responsive than Congress to state regulatory concerns around the 2006 REAL ID Act).
269. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Perspective, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 843–45 (2003) (documenting state contacts with OIRA).
270. For the most recent of these, see Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693–94 (May 20, 2009); see also Exec. Order
No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (entitled
“Federalism”).
271. Exec. Order No. 13,132, §6(a).
272. Id. §6(c).
273. Mendelson, supra note 151, at 741. Recent examples of cooperative regulatory schemes
that reserve significant roles for state exercises of discretionary authority are the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism
Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 614 (2011) (discussing structures of Dodd-Frank Act
that provide state officials with a direct role in administrative decisionmaking).
274. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1271–84 (2009) (providing examples); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1698–
1703 (2001) (describing local tailoring, interstate competition, and experimentation as reasons
for cooperative federalism).
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agency willingness to use coercive powers to force strict compliance
with Congress’s mandates.275
Again, we need not resolve the empirical questions implicit in
these ambitious claims lodged on behalf of “administrative
federalism.”276 For it is not at all clear that many (or any) of these
arguments can be carried over to the foreign affairs context. As a
threshold matter, the Administrative Procedure Act expressly
exempts foreign policy matters from its reach.277 Centralized
regulatory review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”) does not reach most foreign affairs matters.278 Even the
rarely used Congressional Review Act excludes security and trade
matters, thereby excluding most foreign affairs questions.279 As a
result, states cannot participate in foreign affairs matters as fully as
they participate in domestic rulemaking because they lack the full
panoply of tools for intervening in the regulatory process that would
otherwise be available. Worse, information about many nonstatutory
international arrangements is unavailable until months after a policy
decision has been made.280 Perhaps unsurprisingly, although
empirical studies reveal a handful of instances in which any agency—
the State Department or otherwise—formally analyzed a regulation
for federalism concerns, to the extent we are able to tell, none of these

275. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983,
and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 462 (2008) (noting that the federal
agency responsible for Medicaid “is notoriously uninterested in enforcing the terms of State
plans against the states; instead it seeks cooperation, when it makes demands at all”); accord
Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It Might Be
Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2328 (2010) (“The problem today is not a lack of
regulatory presence but rather a lack of regulatory rigor.”).
276. Metzger, supra note 273, 610–19 (defining and describing the term).
277. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2006) (stating that rulemaking requirements do not extend to
any “military or foreign affairs function of the United States”). This cannot be defended on the
ground that Congress carefully considered the question. See Hathaway, supra note 156, at 243 &
n.312 (discussing legislative history of exception).
278. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 3(d)(2) (Sept. 30, 1993), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (refusing to include most regulations that pertain to foreign affairs
from the reach of the order). In any case, there is some recent evidence to suggest that OIRA
review is slanted toward business interests. See RENA STEINZOR ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER SAFETY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles
/OIRA_Meetings_1111.pdf (discussing the politics of OIRA review).
279. 5 U.S.C. § 801(c)(2)(C)–(D). We have identified no instance in which the Congressional
Review Act has been employed in a foreign relations matter.
280. Hathaway, supra note 156, at 222 (“Until fairly recently, the text of many [sole
executive agreements and ex ante congressional executive agreements] was not available until at
least a year after they were concluded.”).
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involved a foreign affairs matter.281 Finally, we think it is important to
recognize that none of our examples of federalism foreign affairs
conflict arise in the context of a cooperative federalism scheme. Hence,
there is no reason to think that executive actors will be influenced by
their past interactions with state officials.
In addition to these disanalogies in the administrative process
with respect to domestic and foreign policy matters, foreign policy is
often the product of idiosyncratic internal bureaucratic dynamics.282
Most studies suggest that interagency politics, internal hierarchies,
and entrenched organizational pathways exert great influence on
agencies’ final decisions.283 Policies emerge through competition
among agencies in a “marketplace of ideas,”284 refereed in some
instances by the President. None of this is to say that foreign policy
making is perfectly insulated from domestic political forces.285 Of
course, it is not. Rather, the arguments we have presented here
suggest that there is little evidence to conclude that institutional
structures for the generation of federal foreign policy purposefully and
carefully consider the states’ interest in regulatory autonomy.
***
Legislative safeguards of federalism fail to consider the effect of
foreign affairs action on states. Recent accounts of executive-branch
safeguards are equally dismaying. There is no reason to believe the
policymaking process, through which the federal government
identifies and promotes foreign policy (as distinct from domestic
281. See Mendelson, supra note 151, at 783; Mendelson, supra note 265, at 695–718;
Sharkey, supra note 161, at 527.
282. For seminal studies of bureaucracy in the foreign policy–making domain, see Graham
Allison & Mort Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications, 24
WORLD POL. 40, 42 (1972) (emphasizing bureaucratic dynamics). For an early challenge to this
claim, see Robert J. Art, Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique, 4 POL’Y
SCI. 467, 486 (1973) (doubting the explanatory force of models that focus exclusively on
bureaucratic dynamics without accounting for external partisan political forces).
283. See GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELLIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION 166–70 (2d ed. 1999)
(emphasizing the importance of “standard operating procedures” in determining policy
outcomes); Art, supra note 282, at 479 (exploring limits of presidential control); Barton J.
Bernstein, Understanding Decision-Making: United States Foreign Policy and the Cuban Missile
Crisis, 25 INT’L SECURITY 134, 159–64 (2000) (emphasizing importance of hierarchy and
presidential leadership). Even critics of the bureaucratic politics paradigm nevertheless concede
the importance of “factors that are either determined or strongly influenced by organizational or
bureaucratic considerations.” David A. Welch, The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic
Politics Paradigm, 17 INT’L SECURITY 112, 138 (1992).
284. Martin A. Smith, U.S. Bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq, 14
CONTEMP. POL. 91, 97 (2008).
285. For an acute analysis of the connection between domestic politics and military conflicts,
see James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of Political Disputes, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577, 586 (1994).
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policy), will systematically account for the federalism-related goods
identified in the previous Section. Assuming that weak executivebranch mechanisms for internalizing federalism values warrant
additional safeguards, we demonstrated in this Part that the case for
judicial vigilance on behalf of states’ regulatory autonomy is strong.
That result means that it is necessary to assess the case on behalf of
federal control when foreign affairs and federalism concerns overlap—
a task we turn to in the next Part.
IV. THE CASE FOR CENTRALIZED PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
This Part analyzes the case for centralizing foreign affairs–
related authority in the presidency.286 We first demonstrate that
cogent arguments exist for centralization. But we add a crucial caveat:
the strength of these arguments varies as the geopolitical
environment changes. The core of our argument is that the
presumption should favor federal control when the U.S. faces a more
hazardous and demanding international environment (i.e., when the
world is multipolar and not unipolar). We develop a parsimonious
doctrinal framework to account for relevant international factors. We
conclude by canvassing the mechanisms that courts could use to
assess the geopolitical state of the world.
A. The Variable Benefits of Foreign Affairs Centralization
Consider the general case for centralizing regulatory authority
over foreign affairs. Traditional justifications for centralization in the
national government focus on collective action problems.287 Public
goods such as military security and a national free market are often
best achieved through national, rather than subnational,
interventions. At the time of the Founding, the Framers perceived the
absence of a concerted American voice in the international sphere to

286. Recall that by stipulation we are concerned with cases where Congress has not clearly
spoken.
287. BEDNAR, supra note 217, at 25 (“In general, security is promoted through command
coordination, implying centralization of foreign policy and war-making.”); accord CURTIS A.
BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 208–09 (4th ed. 2011); see also JAMES
MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 71
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (framing flaws in the Articles of Confederation in terms of modern
conceptualization of collective action problems).
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be a major weakness of the Articles of Confederation.288 The
Constitution, accordingly, limits the capacity of states to sign
international agreements289 or engage in military activity.290 The
functional argument for centralization is even more compelling: given
the importance of speed, secrecy, and foreign affairs expertise in
providing military security, the centralization of diplomatic, military,
and intelligence authorities in a single institutional actor makes
sense.291 Were such authority dispersed among the several states, it
would be extremely difficult for the United States to address
diplomatic or military threats in the current international
environment.
Similarly, maintenance of economic prosperity requires
national-level coordination. For geographic, demographic, and
technological reasons, the several states are unlikely to share the
same interests in shaping economic policy. Some states’ economies
depend on agricultural goods, others on manufacturing, and still
others on the provision of goods and services. Such varied
commitments naturally lead to competing interests in relation to free
trade, tariffs, taxes, and trade-related subsidies. States will inevitably
try to achieve their internal economic goals without taking full
account of the externalities of their policies on other states.292 This
collective action problem is best addressed at the national level, where
the federal government can select net beneficial economic policies.
Centralization increases overall social welfare.293
This is all familiar fare. Less canonical is the further
observation that the benefits of centralized foreign affairs authority
288. See ONUF & ONUF, supra note 132, at 93–122 (explaining how the Articles of
Confederation inhibited the development of a unified American foreign policy); accord Larry D.
Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 618 (1999).
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . .
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . . .”).
290. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . .
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay . .
. .”).
291. But cf. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64
STAN. L. REV. 289, 307–09 (2012) (arguing that some decentralization of intelligence powers is
inevitable).
292. This can be understood as a claim about the negative externalities that arise from
states’ free riding. Cf. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 138 (2010) (linking free riding to the need for
national solutions).
293. One of the authors has elsewhere developed some reasons for caution about standard
collective action federalism arguments. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective
Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with authors).
The argument developed here does not rely on the species of broad-brush, wholesale arguments
critiqued in that article.
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vary with the international environment. To see why the value of
centralization depends on characteristics of the international
environment, imagine a world with no dictatorships—a world with
only democratic states that are committed to the resolution of
international disputes by peaceful means.294 In this world, the need for
military security exists, but probably not at the level required in a
world with many competing authoritarian regimes. Stated otherwise,
fully realizing the benefits of centralization with regard to military
security is more important in a competitive geopolitical environment
than in one where the United States acts as a de facto hegemon.295
Trade provides another example. Consider a world with high levels of
trade protectionism, tariffs, and import duties. In this world,
centralization is particularly important. The national government
must navigate a complicated international environment to maintain
economic prosperity. This requires expertise and an effective (i.e., not
plurivocal) negotiation strategy. Under these conditions, a
decentralized approach to policy will likely be suboptimal for the
nation.
These examples suggest that the value of centralization varies
with geopolitical conditions facing the United States. To be sure, the
examples do not reflect the full complexity of international politics, the
difficulty of determining salient factors that affect the value of
centralization, or the integration of international political variables
into a default presumption for courts to apply. However, they do
clarify that geopolitical conditions lie at the heart of any defense of
centralization’s virtues in the foreign affairs context.
B. Judicially Manageable Proxies for Geopolitical Conditions
It is one thing to observe that the value of centralization varies
with changes in the international environment. It is quite another to
say that federal courts should take account of such changes in setting
the appropriate presumption in foreign affairs federalism. In the
balance of this Part, we argue this task is judicially manageable. We
argue courts should apply a presumption in favor of federal control in
foreign affairs federalism cases (as we have defined that term) when
the U.S. operates in a multipolar (or highly constrained) international
environment. However, courts should apply a presumption in favor of
state control when the United States is the hegemon of a unipolar (or
294. There are different conceptions of democratic peace theory. For greater discussion, see
Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1983).
295. See Abebe, supra note 34 (developing this argument at length).
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weakly constrained) international environment. At present, courts
lack a framework to account for international political factors that
should inform the appropriate presumption. This deficiency leads to
the kind of ad hoc, erratic jurisprudence described in Part I. To fill
this gap, we offer a parsimonious and easily applied framework for
evaluating the international political environment.
Conventional wisdom suggests that courts lack the competence
to analyze the international political environment and integrate their
findings into foreign affairs jurisprudence. Scholars often argue that
the President enjoys institutional and epistemic advantages that place
him in a better position than judges to consider international politics
and make foreign affairs decisions.296 As a result, courts’ participation
in foreign affairs cases is unhelpful, or even counterproductive. Even if
one assumes arguendo that the President is more competent in foreign
affairs, that does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that courts
have no capacity to identify and to account for the foreign affairs
implications of their doctrinal rules. As we will discuss, the courts use
this institutional capacity—often supplemented by the State
Department and amicus curiae briefs—to analyze the foreign affairs
consequences of some of its decisions.
Nevertheless, if the optimal preemption rule in foreign affairs
cases depends in part upon international political factors, courts need
a parsimonious, clear, and functional tool to reduce the complexity of
international politics and integrate the resultant information into
their doctrinal analysis. Such a tool is difficult to develop because of
the plurality of salient actors in current international politics. Today,
multiple powerful countries drive international politics by pursuing
their own national interests; international organizations purport to
regulate world affairs;297 international tribunals attempt to apply
296. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 135, at 174 (“Executives have always had the
leading role in foreign affairs because of the fast-changing nature of international relations and
the importance of secrecy and unity.”); accord Posner & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1204–07
(arguing that courts should defer to the executive branch unless “it is plainly inconsistent with
the statute, unreasonable, or constitutionally questionable,” because of the executive’s continued
activism in foreign relations and greater accountability).
297. The United Nations is the most salient example of this type of organization. N.D.
WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY 3 (2d ed. 1997) (“The principal function of the United Nations is to
maintain international peace and security.”). But see John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of
International Institutions, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1994-95, at 7 (arguing that “institutions . . .
hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world,” because institutions “are
based on the self-interested calculations of great powers” and thus “have no independent effect
on state behavior”). See generally LELAND M. GOODRICH & ANNE P. SIMONS, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 597–603 (1955)
(describing the purpose of the United Nations as the “maintenance of international peace and
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international law;298 and nongovernmental actors lobby states and
encourage best practices.299 This partial list highlights the range and
complexity of actors influencing the contemporary international
political environment.
Building on an earlier article, we draw on the concept of
“polarity” to develop a framework that enables courts to evaluate the
international political environment.300 That framework, originally
developed to help courts appropriately constrain the President in
foreign affairs, can also enable courts to determine the value of
centralization in foreign affairs federalism matters. The framework
captures many of the relevant variables and generates parsimonious
guidance for resolving conflicts between the state and federal
governments.
1. Polarity and Centralization
To assess the value of foreign affairs centralization, judges can
employ an idea developed in international relations theory—the
concept of polarity301—to categorize the powerful countries in the
world and their impact on international politics. Polarity refers to the
number of “great powers” (powerful countries) in the world at any
given time. Great powers are determined by their material power,
namely their military strength and economic wealth.302 The number of
security,” which is accomplished through the actions of their collective members in various
principal United Nations organizations).
298. Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International
Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 160 (2000); Suzannah Linton & Firew Kebede
Tiba, The International Judge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and Tribunals, 9 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 407, 408 (2009) (“Within this evolving international system, legal disputes are
increasingly brought for resolution before judicial or quasi-judicial institutions.”).
299. For example, Human Rights Watch regularly provides detailed reports on human
rights abuses, health, environmental protection, corporate responsibility, and state
counterterrorism efforts, among other things. Reports, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/publications/reports (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
300. See Abebe, supra note 34, at 23 (developing this argument at length).
301. ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11 (1990) (“Indeed, the realists’ very distinction between different
international systems as unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar is drawn from economics.”); see, e.g.,
Joanne Gowa, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1245, 1255–56
(1989) (demonstrating that bipolar international political systems are more advantageous than
multipolar systems in free trade because of stronger incentives for alliance and lower chances of
exit); Edward D. Mansfield, Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power, 37 INT’L
STUD. Q. 105, 110–12 (1993) (arguing that polarity is more useful when combined with an
analysis of concentration of power).
302. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 55–67 (2001)
(summarizing how power in international politics is based on latent, or socioeconomic, power,
and military power); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 193 (1979)
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great powers determines the structure, or polarity, of the
international system. A world with three or more great powers is a
multipolar system; one with two great powers is a bipolar system; one
with one dominant superpower is a unipolar system. The key point
here is that the structure of the international system—whether
multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar—roughly correlates to the ease or
difficulty of achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. As a consequence,
polarity provides a simply proxy for the value of centralization in the
foreign affairs domain.
To see how this would work, consider the effect of multipolar
and unipolar international conditions on the United States’ ability to
achieve policy goals. In a multipolar system, the United States is one
of several great powers. No single great power is more powerful than
the others; they are relative equals in international politics. To make
the example more concrete, imagine the United States is competing
with Countries X, Y, and Z. They are rough equals, and each is
pursuing its own foreign policy goals. In pursuit of their goals, these
great powers might find that they have convergent or competing
objectives. The United States and Country X might want greater trade
liberalization. The United States, Country Y, and Country Z might
disagree on economic coordination, environmental policies, and
security concerns. Since each great power is relatively similar in
economic and military strength, none is strong enough to go it alone
and impose its preferences on the other great powers. The United
States and Countries X, Y, and Z must instead pursue their respective
foreign policy goals in a highly competitive international political
environment. Each lacks the ability to impose unilaterally its
preferences. In this multipolar world, the interests of Countries X, Y,
and Z therefore constrain the United States’ ability to achieve its
foreign policy goals. Simply put, the United States cannot pursue its
preferred policies as it pleases. Instead, it must internalize the costs of
interference with Countries X, Y, and Z and determine whether a goal
is worth those potential costs. The complexities of international
politics in a multipolar world thus present serious challenges to the
achievement of U.S. interests.
From this stylized example, it becomes clear that multipolarity
directly influences any assessment of foreign affairs federalism.
Consider the following extension of the previous example. Imagine
that the United States is in a multipolar system with China,
Germany, and Russia. China has the world’s largest economy; many
(explaining that modern “great powers” are distinguished by their relatively high levels of
economic and military independence).
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countries, including the United States, want to access the Chinese
market. Imagine further that China is an authoritarian government
with a poor human rights record. Wyoming, angered by the Chinese
government’s abuse of people in Tibet, passes a statute prohibiting the
state from doing business with companies that conduct business with
the Chinese government and any of its state-owned enterprises. The
United States, through the President and Congress, already
condemned the Chinese government’s human rights record and passed
a statute placing targeted sanctions against a small number of
Chinese state-owned enterprises. The statute is ambiguous as to
whether its enumeration of sanctioned enterprises is exhaustive or
illustrative.
The Supreme Court must either invalidate or uphold the
Wyoming statute. In effect, the Supreme Court must decide if a
presumption in favor of centralization (in the federal government) or
decentralization (through federalism) is warranted in the absence of
clear statutory direction either one way or another. In this example,
many countries, including the United States and the other great
powers, want to ensure that their companies can pursue business
opportunities in the Chinese market. The United States, though, lacks
the capacity to try and impose its preferences on China or the other
great powers. Its leverage is therefore limited—Wyoming’s statute
might generate a Chinese response that restricts U.S. business
opportunities in China and creates serious losses for the nation.
Hence, the multipolar geopolitical conditions mean that one state’s
action can have grave implications for the United States.
Therefore, when the United States confronts a multipolar
world, the Supreme Court should apply a presumption in favor of the
federal government. In a multipolar world, the benefits of
centralization to national economic prosperity likely outweigh the
benefits to all but one of the fifty states. The United States does not
have the power to leverage its economic or military strength on other
countries to pursue its preferences. In consequence, the federal
government’s ability to coordinate the interests of the several states
and determine appropriate policy is a valuable policy tool. Perhaps
more ominously, other great powers might strategically exploit
conflicts between the federal government and the several states. For
example, the third-party great power can effectively “divide and
conquer” by providing the state with some marginal benefit (e.g.,
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investment or trade opportunities) that impedes the realization of
collective goods by the United States.303
This dynamic, however, changes in a unipolar world in which
the United States is the hegemon of international politics.304 Under
those (hypothetical) conditions, it has the world’s strongest military
and the largest economy. While the United States certainly cannot
impose binding global rules, it can more easily influence foreign policy
than under multipolar circumstances. To be clear, this does not mean
that the United States is omnipotent or unconstrained. Rather, our
argument is that the constraints on the United States created by other
great powers in the multipolar world do not exist to the same degree
in the unipolar world. Hence, in these circumstances the federal
government has greater flexibility—although not infinite capacity—to
realize its objectives.
Returning to our example, how should the Supreme Court treat
the same Wyoming statute in a unipolar world? When the United
States operates as a hegemon in a unipolar system, the Supreme
Court should apply a presumption in favor of the states. Under these
hypothetical conditions, the United States is far better situated to
realize its preferences and gain access to the Chinese market
regardless of what Wyoming does. Here, China must be sensitive to
the American foreign policy objectives because of the United States’
superpower status. In light of American strength, the case for
centralized control of economic policy is weaker because the costs of
decentralization are smaller.305 Indeed, the greater freedom of action
that the United States has as a hegemon in a unipolar world might
even encourage experimentation at the state level. Experimentation,
like the hypothetical Wyoming enactment, might identify instances in
which the national government is too narrowly defining the national
interest in relation to public preferences. While this possibility arises
without regard to the international political environment, the cost of
303. See Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian Vermeule, Divide and Conquer, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 417, 426–27 (2010) (modeling divide and conquer strategies as, inter alia, a
Stag Hunt game, and explaining how third-party bribes can yield suboptimal outcomes for
participants).
304. For arguments that the United State is often hegemonic, see Stephen G. Brooks &
William C. Wohlforth, American Primacy in Perspective, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 20–21
(“If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will.”); Ian L.G.
Wadley, U.S. and Them: Hubs, Spokes, & Integration with Reference to Transboundary
Environment and Resource Issues, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 572, 578–79 (2003) (noting American
attempts to maintain good state-to-state relationships while preserving its status as a hegemonic
state).
305. We do not address here the possibility that it is centralization that yields hegemonic
status. It suffices to say that the United States has arguably played the role of a hegemon
historically despite some decentralization.
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addressing such deficiencies is smaller in a unipolar world than in a
multipolar world.
Building on this last point, we note that it is difficult to
quantify the magnitude of the potential benefits from state foreign
affairs experimentation in the unipolar world (or the potential costs of
such experimentation in a multipolar world). Similarly, it is hard to
quantify the potential benefits from and costs of centralization in a
multipolar world. We concede that there is no precise answer to these
inquiries; they rest on several context-specific factors beyond the scope
of our parsimonious theory. Nevertheless, our approach makes
significant progress on these complex questions.
With respect to questions of optimal institutional design, our
approach suggests that state experimentation in foreign affairs will be
more likely to generate positive outcomes and catalyze national
government action in the unipolar world since the United States can
more easily absorb the potential geopolitical consequences. At the
same time, the values of centralization—including speed, coordination,
and expertise—will most likely generate the greatest benefits in the
multipolar world, where the United States is most constrained. Unlike
formalists, who fail to consider the costs and benefits of centralization,
and unlike some functionalists, who tend to favor centralization in the
presidency when it comes to foreign affairs matters, our claim takes
seriously the role of international political factors. In our view, it
appropriately homes in on a metric for thinking about the tradeoffs
between foreign affairs federalism and national government
centralization.
Finally, we note that the conceptual tool that drives the
analysis—polarity—is an especially valuable heuristic because judges
can employ it as a way to organize vast information into a
manageable, readily usable form. Like any heuristic device in a
parsimonious structural theory, the concept of polarity will sometimes
seem vague or will fail to capture all of the intricacies of international
politics. If the international political environment informs the costs
and benefits of foreign affairs federalism—and we believe it does—we
must not jettison polarity. We must not continue to evaluate foreign
affairs federalism solely on formalist doctrine and the sparse,
incomplete textual directives of a 225-year-old Constitution. Polarity
provides a useful, easily applicable tool to understand the
international environment and the wisdom of varying levels of foreign
affairs centralization.
To summarize, there is a simple correlation between polarity
and the benefits of foreign policy centralization: As geopolitical
constraints on the United States grow, the courts should favor
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centralization. As those constraints on the United States shrivel away,
the courts should favor greater federalism in foreign affairs. A
multipolar world should produce foreign affairs presumptions in favor
of the national government. A unipolar world with the United States
as the superpower should produce presumptions in favor of the states,
resulting in greater federalism.
2. Polarity, Issue by Issue
As described so far, a polarity-based framework assesses the
benefits of foreign affairs–related centralization at a high level of
generality through a composite judgment about material, military,
and economic power. Nations can vary along these dimensions:
military, material, and economic wealth might not all correlate.
Moreover, superiority along any one of these measures may not be
relevant to a particular national policy question—for example, trade
sanctions against Burma (or Myanmar) or negotiations with Austrian
insurance companies. Although more speculative, this suggests that
the framework of polarity might provide some guidance, however
limited, at a more granular, issue-by-issue level: we should consider
power or influence within a specific field in foreign affairs. Without
expanding the concept of polarity beyond a point at which it is no
longer useful, it may nonetheless be feasible to refine the analysis in
ways that promote effective judicial action without dramatically
raising decision costs.306
Consider a motivating example: the United States has the most
advanced military in the world, and its military expenditures exceed
those of the next ten countries combined.307 Along the military or
security dimension, the United States is clearly a superpower today; it
operates in functionally unipolar circumstances. Its capacity to
leverage its power and realize its preferences in international politics
is correspondingly high when military power is at issue. At the same
time, the United States is not a superpower in a unipolar world when
it comes to setting international trade or environmental policy.
Rather, the United States operates in a multipolar context; it cannot
impose its preferences on, for example, China or the European

306. Accord BANKS & BLAKEMAN, supra note 16, at 224 (suggesting that the Court could
“pragmatically adjudicate cases in terms of discrete policy areas” in foreign affairs federalism
matters).
307. Background Paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure Data, 2011, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE
RES. INST., 2 (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-onmilitary-expenditure-2011.pdf.
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Union.308 Hence, the United States might be generally unconstrained,
but significantly limited with respect to a specific foreign affairs issue.
Nevertheless, a polarity-based framework still provides
guidance. Though the analysis certainly becomes more complicated at
the more granular level, courts can still ascertain the merits of
presumption in favor of centralization in light of the constraints on the
United States. Courts would simply consider the constraints with
respect to a specific foreign affairs issue, such as international trade,
the environment, or national security. Even if the international
political environment varies on an issue-to-issue basis, the concept of
polarity is still helpful in capturing the relative costs and benefits of
centralization. At the very least, it provides a rough metric to evaluate
the power of the United States relative to the rest of the world in more
discrete areas of foreign affairs.
We want to emphasize that polarity does not provide a perfect
proxy for judgments about the international political environment.
Rather, the polarity framework sufficiently guides judges in
evaluating the merits of centralization in light of the vagaries of
international politics. This is true at the systemic level and we posit
that it can be useful at the issue-by-issue level as well. We also should
be clear that this more granular use of the presumption requires
judges to impose some taxonomical order on the unruly world of
international affairs—deciding, for example, how to draw the line
between trade and military disputes, or human rights and resource
access questions. Although we recognize that many of these lines will
be debatable, we think that courts and commentators already employ
a rough categorization of foreign affairs issues that serves tolerably
well for our doctrinal purposes.
To make more granular judgments about the benefits of
centralization in a given case, courts could use a variety of practical
tools and devices available in the litigation process to gain information
about polarity in discrete areas of foreign affairs, including State
Department statements of interest and amicus curiae briefs. Attention
to the usage of these tools in earlier cases suggests that the
conventional skepticism about courts’ ability to make careful
judgments about the relative costs or benefits of foreign policy
centralization can be overstated. Informed directly by the political
branches, but still able to benefit epistemically through adversarial

308. See Krittivas Mukherjee & Alister Doyle, World Leaders Try to Save Troubled Climate
Talks,
REUTERS
(Dec.
16,
2009),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/12/16/idINIndia44776420091216 (describing divisive climate talks at Copenhagen in which U.S. negotiators were
locked in debate and unable to reach an agreement accommodating their preferences).
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presentations, the courts seem not to be disabled meaningfully from
the sort of general judgment that a polarity analysis entails.
Judicial experience with international human rights litigation
is instructive in this regard. Under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”),309
aliens can bring suit in U.S. courts against other aliens for a tort in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty. Aliens have filed hundreds
of lawsuits alleging violations of international human rights law;
many of the lawsuits involve sensitive foreign policy issues. In such
cases, federal courts solicited statements of interest (“SOI”) from the
U.S. State Department to better understand the potential foreign
policy complications of specific cases. Courts also considered the
merits of the executive branch’s suggestions of dismissal. Additionally,
courts independently have determined the wisdom of adjudicating
cases involving serious violations of human rights. While these SOIs
do not comprehensively describe U.S. foreign policy, they provide the
courts with sufficient information to evaluate the international
political environment. If the executive branch concludes that a specific
case will likely complicate its foreign affairs initiatives, it has ample
incentive to provide enough information in the SOI to be persuasive to
a court.310
Another example derives from cases arising from the resolution
of claims between either (1) the United States and the Soviet Union311
or (2) the United States and Iran.312 In both lines of cases, the Court
generally has succeeded in identifying and carefully balancing foreign
policy concerns, even when validating presidential action. Courts also
consider potential international relations ramifications when
determining whether to hear cases on the merits. Consider, for
example, the landmark case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino.313 This seminal foreign affairs case involves the act of state

309. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948); see, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2007) (ruling that plaintiffs may sue defendant
corporations for violations of international law related to Apartheid under the Alien Tort Claims
Act); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242–44 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing the lower court and finding
claims of genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary execution in Bosnia-Herzeovina to be
sufficiently alleged under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
310. SOIs can take a variety of positions, from counseling dismissal to supporting plaintiffs.
311. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227–28 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 330 (1937) (allowing the President to resolve outstanding claims between Russia and the
United States without the advice and consent of the Senate).
312. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (holding that the
President has power to settle by executive order claims that are “a necessary incident to the
resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and where, as here,
we conclude that Congress acquiesced to the President’s action”).
313. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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doctrine.314 In weighing the application of the doctrine, the Supreme
Court closely analyzed the relationship between the United States and
Cuba after the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, recognized
limits to its capacity to make foreign affairs determinations, and
interpreted the international law restrictions on expropriation.315
While foreign affairs concerns, by themselves, were not the central
focus of the case, the Court considered the potential consequences of
its decision in light of the international political conditions of the day.
In all these domains, courts successfully gather information and make
reasoned judgments about geopolitical conditions.
In addition to SOIs from the State Department, courts
routinely gain information about polarity from two other sources.
First, courts learn about foreign affairs through the amicus curiae
briefs. For example, consider Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,316 a pivotal
case regarding the validity of international human rights litigation in
United States courts. In Sosa, the Supreme Court addressed the
meaning and scope of the ATS, concluding that the ATS permitted,
under certain conditions, a limited number of actionable claims based
on international law.317 At least seventeen amicus curiae briefs
informed the Court’s decision, including submissions from the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Australia; the National Foreign Trade
Council, the World Jewish Congress, and the American Jewish
Committee; and a number of women’s human rights organizations and

314. Id. at 416:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.
315. See id. at 410 (“Respondents . . . contend that relations between the United States and
Cuba manifest such animosity that unfriendliness is clear . . . .”); id. at 429:
There is, of course, authority, in international judicial and arbitral decisions, in the
expressions of national governments [with free market economies] . . . for the view
that a taking is improper under international law if it is not for a public purpose, is
discriminatory, or is without provision of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation. However, Communist countries . . . commonly recognize no obligation
on the part of the taking country.
Id. at 433 (“Another serious consequence of the exception pressed by respondents would be to
render uncertain titles in foreign commerce, with the possible consequence of altering the flow of
international trade.”).
316. 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) (holding that Mexican national could not bring a Federal Tort
Claims Act suit against the U.S. government based on his “allegation that the Drug Enforcement
Administration instigated his abduction from Mexico for criminal trial” and that he could not
“recover under the Alien Tort Statute”).
317. Id. at 720.
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the Presbyterian Church of Sudan.318 Given the breadth of
submissions, it is plausible to think that amicus briefing will often
serve as another mechanism for courts (and especially the Supreme
Court) to gather information about the foreign affairs implications of
adjudicating sensitive cases on the merits.
Finally, federal judges tend to be simply more informed about
foreign affairs and international politics relative to the recent past.
Due to a constellation of factors, including the rise of information
technology and states’ increased usage of international institutions
like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the ready
availability to judges of information about governance structure,
national interests, and foreign policies has never been greater. While
courts have not suddenly become experts in the conception, design,
and execution of U.S. foreign policy, they have an improved capacity to
evaluate foreign affairs. We argue that courts also have improved
capacity to utilize our framework to better understand the
relationship between international politics and the merits of a
presumption against centralization under certain conditions.
***
In sum, courts already make determinations about the
magnitude of foreign affairs concerns. Once that is conceded, the
polarity-based framework simply becomes a way of organizing and
rationalizing what are now ad hoc judgments into a clear and
parsimonious framework. That framework provides a simple way for
courts to assess whether there is an interest in centralized
policymaking that is likely to overcome the states’ interest in
regulation.
C. Applications
By now, our basic analytic framework for foreign affairs
federalism cases should be clear. Stated briefly, we recommend the
following: Apply a presumption in favor of state regulatory authority
when centralization is unnecessary, and apply a presumption in favor
of federal regulatory authority when centralization is necessary. In
determining whether centralization is warranted, ask whether the
United States operates in a multipolar or a unipolar environment on a
given issue. If the world is effectively multipolar, centralization is
likely the better default rule.
318. See Highlights of the Supreme Court’s 2003-2004 Term: References for Sosa v. AlvarezMachain
(June
29,
2004),
CORNELL
UNIV.
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/background/03-339_ref.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (listing
various amicus filings).
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To show how this works in practice, we return briefly to some
of the cases discussed in Part I. To begin with, consider Belmont and
Pink, which concerned the Litvinov Agreement.319 The Court decided
these two cases in 1937 and 1942, in the midst of a time of rapid
changes in international politics.320 At the time, the world was best
characterized as highly multipolar. The Soviet Union, Nazi Germany,
imperial Japan, and the United States were all great powers with
starkly competing national interests. The United States confronted an
international environment that entailed grave constraints.
Accordingly, it could not readily leverage its power and realize its
policy preferences, especially in light of the interests of other states.
Given these conditions, our polarity-based framework suggests that
the Court in Belmont and Pink applied the proper presumption in
favor of centralization to resolve conflicts over the President’s
authority to settle claims in New York.321 Notice that the same logic
might be extended to Hines v. Davidowitz, the 1939 case that
concerned Pennsylvania’s alien registration statute,322 and Zschernig
v. Miller, in which the Court invalidated Oregon’s Cold War–era
escheat rule specifying the inheritance rights of heirs from
Communist countries.323 In both of these cases, the state rule touched
upon delicate international concerns at a time when the multipolar
international political environment made such experimentation risky
or even dangerous. In each case, the Court properly applied a
presumption in favor of the national government because the benefits
of centralizing foreign policy authority in the national government
were likely high.
In contrast, we find cause to reconsider Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council324 and American Insurance Ass’n v.
Garamendi,325 more recent cases in which states targeted,
respectively, entities trading with Burma and insurance companies
that had connived with the Nazi regime during World War II. In both
instances, a polarity-based framework suggests that the Court likely
erred in assuming that federal regulation was presumptively

319. See supra text accompanying notes 68–73.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 68–73.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 68–73.
322. 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
323. 389 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1968).
324. 530 U.S. 363, 366, 388 (2000) (declaring Massachusetts statute prohibiting certain
state transactions with Burma unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause).
325. 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (holding that executive authority in domain of foreign affairs
preempted California statute requiring disclosures by insurance companies that sold policies in
Europe during the Holocaust).
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warranted. When these cases were decided, the United States was the
clear hegemon in a unipolar world. The United States was not only the
dominant country vis-à-vis the other powerful states in the world, but
also with regard to Burma, and the United States market was
exceedingly attractive to European insurance companies. In this
unipolar context, the benefits of centralizing authority in the national
government are reduced with respect to military security. The United
States is already a superpower; greater centralization would likely
produce diminished returns. Application of a polarity framework
suggests that the Court should have applied the presumption in favor
of Massachusetts and California, respectively, over the national
government.
Finally, in the recent immigration context in which Arizona v.
United States326 arises, the United States (to date) has no clear
competitor. It sets the terms for its own global migration. Under those
circumstances, the costs of state experimentation—at least setting
aside any questions of individual rights—are low. Accordingly, the
Arizona Court should at minimum have begun its analysis with a
presumption in favor of the relevant state law, rather than the
peroration to nationalism with which Justice Kennedy opened his
argument.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s approach to foreign affairs federalism—
the resolution of overlapping claims to regulatory authority by the
states and the President in the absence of some dispositive source of
enacted law (constitutional provision, statute, or treaty)—has until
now been muddled and inconsistent. The most recent entry in that
ledger, Arizona v. United States, does little or nothing to clarify
matters. This Article demonstrates why the existing scholarly
approaches to this problem are inadequate. It offers a secondgeneration functionalist argument that seeks to correct the shortfalls
of previous efforts. To that end, we propose a parsimonious rule: apply
a presumption in favor of state regulation when the United States is
the hegemon of a unipolar world (where the benefits of centralizing
authority are lower), and apply a presumption in favor of the national
government in a multipolar world (where the benefits of centralizing
authority are higher). We do not contend that our framework will
inexorably and necessarily yield the right answer—this is beyond the
grasp of most tractable doctrinal heuristics. Rather, we suggest that
326. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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this framework warrants serious consideration because it has the
potential to lend structure, predictability, and analytic rigor to an area
of jurisprudence that to date has been erratic, unpredictable, and
unprincipled.
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